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Abstract
Recent technological developments allow Internet users to disseminate ideas to a large audience. These technological advances empower individuals and promote important social objectives.
However, they also create a setting for speech-related torts, harm, and abuse. One legal path to
deal with online defamation turns to the liability of online content providers who facilitate the
harmful exchanges. The possibility of bringing them to remove defamatory content and collecting damages from them attracted a great deal of attention in scholarly work, court decisions, and
regulations. Different countries established different legal regimes. The United States allows an
extensive shield—an overall immunity, as it exempts the liability of content providers in speech
torts. This policy is not adopted worldwide. The E.U. directive outlines a “notice-and-takedown”
safe haven. Other countries, such as Canada, use common tort law practices. This Article criticizes all of these policy models for being either over or under inclusive. This Article makes the
case for a context-specific regulatory regime. It identifies specific characteristics of different content providers with their own unique settings, which call for nuanced legal rules that shall provide
an optimal liability regime. To that end, the Article sets forth an innovative taxonomy: it relies
on sociological studies premised on network theory and analysis, which is neutral to technological advances. This framework distinguishes between different technological settings based on the
strength of social ties formed in each context. The Article explains that the strength of such ties
influences the social context of online interactions and flow of information. The strength of ties
is the best tool for designing different liability regimes; such ties serve as a proxy for the severity
of harm that defamatory online speech might cause, and the social norms that might mitigate or
exacerbate speech-related harm. The proposed taxonomy makes it possible to apply a sociological
analysis to legal policy and to outline modular rules for content providers’ liability at every juncture. This Article does so while taking into account basic principles of tort law, as well as freedom
∗
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of speech, reputation, fairness, efficiency, and the importance of promoting innovation.
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One legal path to deal with online defamation turns to the liability
of online content providers who facilitate the harmful exchanges. The
possibility of bringing them to remove defamatory content and collecting
damages from them attracted a great deal of attention in scholarly work,
court decisions, and regulations. Different countries established different
legal regimes. The United States allows an extensive shield—an overall
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work theory and analysis, which is neutral to technological advances.
This framework distinguishes between different technological settings
based on the strength of social ties formed in each context. The Article
explains that the strength of such ties influences the social context of online interactions and flow of information. The strength of ties is the best
tool for designing different liability regimes; such ties serve as a proxy for
the severity of harm that defamatory online speech might cause, and the
social norms that might mitigate or exacerbate speech-related harm.
The proposed taxonomy makes it possible to apply a sociological
analysis to legal policy and to outline modular rules for content providers’ liability at every juncture. This Article does so while taking into account basic principles of tort law, as well as freedom of speech, reputation, fairness, efficiency, and the importance of promoting innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
A lawyer found out that his name was tainted in various online
platforms, where it was stated that he is “a crook.” These defamatory expressions were published in the comments sections following an article on lawyer malpractice. The comments were written
by unknown Internet users in news portals. They were also echoed
in reviews in user-review websites, on blogs, discussion forums,
and social networks. The lawyer claimed that these were false
statements. Yet, he did not know who published them because of
the anonymity or pseudonymity of the users. He turned to the relevant content providers, asked them to take down the expressions,
and filed a libel suit against them. How should the law regulate content providers’ liability for defamation? Should the law outline a
standard liability regime for regulating all types of content providers? Should the law distinguish between them? This Article focuses
on these questions and aims to provide answers.
New digital technologies create a wealth of ideas and content,
which is easily and freely accessible to everyone. Technology reduces the costs of interaction and distribution, enabling beneficial
communication dynamics. It allows end users to spread ideas easily
and quickly to a large audience. These advances empower individuals and promote important social objectives. Yet, they also reduce
the cost of antisocial and destructive activities.1 The chances for
speech-related torts harm and abuse to participants or external users increase manifolds.2 These technological advances create a new
variety of legal questions and challenges to government policy.

1

This Article focuses on the problem of abuse, in which users generate negative-value
content. On the four main problems of user-generated content, see James Grimmelmann,
The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 42, 53 (2015).
2
On anti-social behavior online, see LORI ANDREWS: I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I
SAW WHAT YOU DID: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 72–73 (2012);
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 57, 62–63, 66, 69 (2014)
[hereinafter CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE]; Danielle Keats Citron, Civil Rights
in Our Information, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 31
(Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nusbaum eds., 2010) [hereinafter Citron, Offensive Internet];
Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 62–64 (2009) [hereinafter
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights].
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The law allows two ways to deal with online speech related
torts: (1) filing an action against the end user (the speaker)3 and (2)
filing an action against the intermediary (the content provider),
which facilitated the harmful exchange.4 This Article focuses on
the second, suggesting a model for regulating content providers’
indirect liability for speech torts.
The liability of intermediaries has been the focus of legislation,
judicial decisions, and scholarly work. Uniform liability regimes,
with regard to overall immunity, notice-and-takedown safe haven,
and negligence, have been outlined. These policy models are often
considered either over- or under-inclusive. Unlike these models,
this Article suggests a new and unique innovative regulation model:
a nuanced regulation rule that depends on various online social
contexts.
More than fifty years ago, media scholar Marshall McLuhan
said that “the medium is the message.”5 The medium might be
more significant than the message itself.6 This statement is even
truer in the Internet age.7 Different online settings form different
contexts, which may influence speech within them. Treating cyberspace as a monolithic entity is a mistake. Different social ties are
formed on different types of online platforms. These ties affect users’ digital conduct as well as their credibility and importance. I
believe that social context is as important as the content itself.
Therefore, different online platforms must be categorized accord3

Users often mask their identities and publish texts anonymously. In these cases, the
plaintiff has to unmask the identity of the user in the preliminary stage before filing a suit
against him.
4
On the pros and cons of these two options (direct action against the user and indirect
action against the content provider), see Ronen Perry & Tal Zarsky, Liability for Online
Anonymous Speech: Comparative and Economic Analyses, 5 J. EUR. TORT L. 2, 7–11 (2014)
[hereinafter Perry & Zarsky, Liability for Online Anonymous Speech]; Ronen Perry & Tal
Zarsky, Who Should Be Liable for Online Anonymous Defamation? 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
DIALOGUE 162 (2015).
5
See, e.g., MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN
7 (1964).
6
MARSHALL MCLUHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE: AN
INVENTORY OF EFFECTS 8 (1967).
7
NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS 6
(2010).
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ing to the social structures formed within them. Understanding social networks will allow a more nuanced, context-specific liability
regime. Keeping this goal in mind, this Article is divided into the
following parts:
Part I outlines an overview of the regulatory regimes in different traditional intermediaries outside the web. Historically, the
medium of communication has played a significant role in assessing
liability;8 different intermediaries are governed by different regulatory regimes according to their distinctive characteristics. Afterwards, I examine different liability models for content providers in
different countries, discussing normative considerations from wide
perspectives, such as free speech considerations.
In Part II, I draw the distinctions among various web-based activities, which are then divided into three categories based on the
strength of social ties that users form while conversing in a particular online platform. Instead of relying on technology-based distinctions, I utilize a sociological approach, which is indifferent to technological advancements. Instead, it relies on insights from “network theory.” It focuses on parameters that are designed to predict
the strength of social ties, which are formed online and offline. As
such, it explains social dynamics and provides invaluable insights.
Basing a liability regime on social ties is natural. Speech torts are
affected by the flow of information within social contexts. As a result, it stands to reason that policy should take this context into account and relate to it. Following sociological studies, I identify
three distinctive categories of digital conversations: (1) “free
style”; (2) “peer production”; (3) “deliberation and structuring
communities.”
Part III focuses on the intersection between network theory and
the liability of content providers, applying the sociological insights
to the law. I offer a differential model for regulating the liability of
intermediaries. This model suggests different liability regimes for
different content providers based on the abovementioned categories, while balancing competing interests and policy considerations.
8

Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the Online
Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137, 141 (2008).
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I also address objections and challenges arising from the proposed
model. Applying the model would promote accuracy, certainty, and
the proper balance among human rights, fairness, and efficiency.
I. INTERMEDIARIES’ LIABILITY AND SPEECH TORTS: THE LAW, A
NORMATIVE ANALYSIS, AND A CALL FOR CHANGE
Different traditional offline intermediaries are ruled by different regulatory regimes according to their distinctive characteristics.
This Part overviews, in a nutshell, the regulatory regimes governing different media outlets. I examine the similarities between these
outlets and online content providers. After this comparison, I deal
with the desirable liability regime for regulating content providers.
I describe existing models in different countries and discuss a wide
range of normative considerations for liability. Finally, I propose a
critical analysis of the standard liability models and suggest a new
path instead: a particular differential regulatory regime.
A. Traditional Intermediaries and Liability Regimes
The debate on intermediaries’ liability in speech torts is not
new. The law differentiates between the traditional intermediaries
and regulates them with particular regimes.
The printing press is subjected to legal rules and ethical norms
regulating its activities. For example, newspapers are liable whether they authored the defamatory text or not.9 Journalists have asserted themselves to act in the public interest. The Code of Ethics
of the Society of Professional Journalists, for example, provides
that journalists “should be free of obligation to any interest other
than the public’s right to know,” and they should avoid “conflicts
of interest, real or perceived” and “refuse gifts, favors, fees, free
travel, and special treatment.”10
The obligations of newspapers likely stem from their perceived
role as a watchdog, thus owing a fiduciary duty of sorts to the pub9

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 578 cmt. b, 581(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see
also Ciolli, supra note 8, at 144.
10
See Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83,
123 (2006).
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lic. Press organizations use their social and economic capital to
check the government, and they function as political institutions on
their own, vying for power from a position of power.11 Thus, the
press is often dubbed the “fourth estate.”12 Traditionally, newspaper editors had a significant amount of editorial control and discretion over content. They frequently devoted a significant amount of
time and expense in vetting stories for publication. This often conveyed a sense of authority among readers. Consistent with this perception, courts treat newspapers as if they have adopted the statements they published as their own. Consequently, they are subject
to speech torts liability.13
Media programming is even more central to the public discourse than newspapers. As a result, it is subjected to more comprehensive restrictions and limitations. The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) is the regulating authority of telecommunication media; among other duties, it has the authority to
issue broadcast licenses.14 Public interest obligations ensure that
informative and educational programming remains on our screens,
accessible to the general populace and ensure diversity.
Regulation was required because of spectrum scarcity. The
government’s goal was to balance freedom of speech and an array
of political views with a limited number of channels. The particular
means chosen to attain this end was the fairness doctrine.15 This
11

See TIMOTHY E. COOK, GOVERNING WITH THE NEWS: THE NEWS MEDIA AS A
POLITICAL INSTITUTION, 12 (1998).
12
See Goodman supra note 10, at 122 n.231. The term “fourth estate” was coined by
Thomas Carlyle in 1841 to refer to reporters in the British House of Commons who
exhibited autonomy from the government and assumed a duty to speak the truth. Id.
13
Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 258
(2006); see Ciolli, supra note 8, at 144–45.
14
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–615b (2006). Section 309 of the Act
requires the Commission to consider, in determining the eligible parties to whom licenses
may be granted, whether “the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served”
by such grants. Id. § 309; see also Note, Tilling the Vast Wasteland: The Case for Reviving
Localism in Public Interest Obligations for Cable Television, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1034, 1037–
38, 1049 (2013).
15
This doctrine aimed at advancing the public interest by imposing a standard duty
comprised of two essential elements: (1) “the making of reasonable provision for the
discussion of controversial issues of public importance in the community served” and (2)
the presentation of “different attitudes and viewpoints concerning these vital and often
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doctrine came under constitutional attacks and was eventually
abandoned.16
The legal authority granting the FCC regulatory powers over
cables differs. Unlike broadcasters, whose licenses are awarded
pursuant to regulatory procedures defined and managed by
the FCC, cable companies must petition municipal boards. The
passage of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,17 which compels cable companies to apportion
up to one-third of their channel capacity for the transmission of
local broadcast, marked a significant move by the FCC in the direction of structural, local regulation. For example, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these so-called “must-carry” provisions.18 After remanding this case upon first review for further evidentiary development, the Court ultimately concluded that a “must-carry [provision] serves the Government’s interests in a direct and effective
way” by “ensuring that a number of local broadcasters retain cable
carriage, with the concomitant audience access and advertising
revenues needed to support a multiplicity of stations.” Communication diversity is the core value guiding communication policy and
therefore wins in this case.19
The FCC also regulates the responsibility of broadcasters regarding the identification of sponsors,20 and prompts disclosure
controversial issues.” See Note, supra note 14, at 1038; see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375, 390 (1969).
16
Over time, the FCC’s steadfast adherence to the fairness doctrine waned, as
journalists and other members of the public complained of the chilling effects that
attended compulsory ideological equity. The doctrine was formally abandoned in 1985.
See In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Communication Rules and Regulations
Concerning the Gen. Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d
142, 147 (1985); ANGIE A. WELBORN & HENRY COHEN, CONG. RES. SERV., REGULATION
OF BROADCAST INDECENCY: BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 22 (2005).
17
See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.);
Note, supra note 14, at 1040–52.
18
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
19
See id.; Turner Broad. Sys., v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Bill D. Herman, Opening
Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 103, 116
(2006).
20
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 317(a), 508 (2006).
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obligations.21 Editorial responsibility exists also in this media form,
and as a result, TV and radio editors are liable for slander just as
newspaper editors are liable for publishing defamatory content.
Broadcasters are subject to strict liability. Even “live broadcast” is not an hermetic defense in court, because of the availability
of delaying technologies, which allow editors an overview of live
feeds, and the ability to block harmful speech.22 Liability for “live
broadcast” must balance the value of watching programs and news
in real time,23 and the need to avoid harmful speech.24 As for cable
TV, different laws and liability regimes apply.25
The rationale behind holding media liable for defamatory content is derived from several normative arguments. First, the printing press and programming media possess a significant amount of
editorial control over the content they disseminate. Second, the
spectrum of broadcasting is limited. Thus, it has been argued that
the media holds a public responsibility for using a limited resource.
21

Broadcasters must disclose the identity of sponsorships and sponsors to consumers.
See Goodman, supra note 10, at 109; Zahr Said, Embedded Advertising and the Venture
Consumer, 89 N.C. L. REV. 99, 102 (2010).
22
See Ira P. Robbins, Digitus Impudicus: The Middle Finger and the Law, 41 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1403, 1449–50 (2008). In the United States, live broadcast is not an hermetic
defense. The difficulty to review the program beforehand is just one consideration for
exemption. See Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005 § 3, Pub. L. No. 109-235,
120 Stat. 491; WELBORN & COHEN, supra note 16, at 15; Jenifer L. Marino, More “Filthy
Words” but No “Free Passes” for the “Cost of Doing Business”: New Legislation Is the Best
Regulation for Broadcast Indecency, 15 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 135, 137, 153
(2005).
23
On the importance of immediate real-time broadcast of sport matches, see Mark
Conrad, Fleeting Expletives and Sports Broadcasts: A Legal Nightmare Needs a Safe Harbor,
18 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 175–76, 188, 191, 199 (2008).
24
Other countries have chosen different liability regimes for live broadcast. In Israel,
for example, broadcasters are held liable for live broadcasts as distributors. See Israeli
Defamation Act, §§ 12, 15 (1965). Thus, passive conduits that still maintain control over
the dissemination of information after publication might still face liability if they choose to
continue to disseminate defamatory content after being aware of it. See id.
25
Scholars criticized the difference between broadcast and cable TV. See Lindsay
LaVine, Legislative Update: The Lion, the Witch (Hunt) and the Wardrobe Malfunction:
Congress’s Crackdown on Television Indecency, 15 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 385, 407–
08 (2005). It has been asserted that most people pick up the remote control and pay little
attention to whether they are watching pay stations or regular television as they surf
through channels. Thus, the regulation is only partial. See id.
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Third, programming media is more accessible for the public and
tends to influence viewers more than other traditional intermediaries. Consequently, these reasons justified the strict liability governing this type of media.
Common carriers, such as telephone and telegraph companies,
differ from the printing press and broadcasters. Common law imposed on them a special duty to offer their services to anyone on
just and reasonable terms without discrimination.26 The status of
“common carriers” was later recognized in telecommunication
regulations.27
The law imposes liability on common carriers that discriminate
content without cause. It requires that all customers be served.28
Common carriers traditionally enjoyed immunity for defamatory
statements over their networks since they have no editorial control.29
B. Online Content Providers: Features and Comparison to Traditional
Intermediaries
The Internet has brought new challenges for providers’ liability. This new medium is fundamentally different from traditional
intermediaries both in its architecture and in its applications. Content is almost unlimited; and it is created by active participation of
users. Readers are not only passive consumers, but authors of con-

26

James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED.
COMM. L.J. 225, 252, 261 (2002).
27
For the definition of “common carrier,” see 47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (2012); FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 699–701 (1979).
28
See In re Edwards Indus., Inc., 74 F.C.C.2d 322, 328 (1979); Phil Nichols, Redefining
“Common Carrier”: The FCC’s Attempt at Deregulation by Redefinition, 1987 DUKE L.J.
501, 503 (1987). It should be noted that the law restricts only entities defined under
“common carriers” status from discriminating content. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d
623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014). However, a reform strives to change classification. See Rebecca
R. Ruiz & Steve Lohr, F.C.C. Approves Net Neutrality Rules, Classifying Broadband Internet
Service as a Utility, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/27/
technology/net-neutrality-fcc-vote-internet-utility.html [https://perma.cc/PL8F-RR2L].
29
See Anderson v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 320 N.E.2d 647, 649 (N.Y. 1974); Ciolli, supra note
8, at 145.
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tent as well. Unlike other intermediaries, the Internet is mostly decentralized, without traditional editing.30
At first glance, it would appear as if common carriers are analogous to online content providers. They offer a platform to users:
providers do not create the content itself, but rather serve as a passive conduit of transmission. Therefore, one could argue that content providers should be exempt from liability, as common carriers
are. However, a closer look reveals that this analogy is imprecise.
Internet content providers are not mere conduits, but they possess
the ability to control third-party content,31 as they often do when
they screen content. Moreover, unlike telephone conversations,
the content Internet providers carry is usually available to the public; it is easily accessible and as a result, may cause severe damage
to one’s good name. Thus, content providers do not fit in the same
category as telephone companies.
The wide public access to the content and the ability of content
providers to control it is tangent to broadcasters. Like broadcasters,
content providers reach a wide audience. However, the analogy
ends there. Broadcasters use a limited public resource (the broadcast spectrum). Their liability stems from the influence this medium holds and its credibility. Being a watchdog has its price.32 In
contrast, content providers do not use limited public resources.
The Internet is a decentralized medium, and the influence of a single content item is limited. Additionally, many providers do not
employ editors for user-generated content. Users publish most of
their content in real-time, and the amount of content can be tremendous.33 Therefore, pre-screening content may require signifi30

DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: HOW MASS
COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 37 (2008).
31
See Assaf Hamdani, Who’s Liable For Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 945
(2002).
32
KARINE NAHON & JEFF HEMSLEY, GOING VIRAL 56 (2013) (explaining that the public
still turns to traditional intermediaries because of their ascribed credibility). The public
also turns to traditional intermediaries because of the medium’s ability to deal with the
problem of information overload. Id.
33
See, e.g., Chris Welch, YouTube Users Now Upload 100 Hours of Video Every Minute,
VERGE (May 19, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/5/19/4345514/youtube-usersupload-100-hours-video-every-minute [https://perma.cc/862L-YMA4].
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cant financial resources and time commitment. It is difficult to expect providers to invest the time and effort to that end.34
Live broadcasters and online-content providers are comparable
in some ways: similar to live broadcasting, user-generated content
is uploaded and accessed in real time without editing. However,
this analogy is not complete. In contrast to a live broadcast, usergenerated content remains on the platform and can be located by
search engines.35 Whereas a live broadcast can be recorded for later
viewing,36 the end-user controls the recording, not the broadcaster.
On the Internet, content providers retain control over their content.
To sum up: online-content providers do not fit traditional categories of intermediaries. Analysis of liability regimes applying to
traditional media outlets reveals that different liability regimes regulate different mediums in light of different characteristics.
Matching the liability regime to the medium’s features is an appropriated conceptual model that should be adopted.
C. Content Providers’ Liability: Comparative Perspective
1. The United States
In the United States, lawsuits against online-content providers
are usually blocked.37 Section 230(c) (1) of the Communications
Decency Act (“CDA”) directs that “[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”38 Under this subsection, Congress declared that
online service providers could not be treated as publishers for material they do not develop.39 Congress thus sought to promote self34

See JACQUELINE LIPTON, RETHINKING CYBERLAW: A NEW VISION FOR INTERNET
LAW 120 (2015); Ciolli, supra note 8, at 145.
35
There are exceptions; for example, updates via RSS or mailing lists are similar to live
broadcasts because it is difficult to turn the wheel back after the messages were sent.
36
New technologies, such as TiVo converters for example, enable continuous
recording of broadcasts.
37
See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
38
Id. § 230(c)(1).
39
See id.
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regulation and free speech.40 While doing so, it allowed vibrant Internet enterprises to prosper.41 Congress explicitly departed from
common law defamation jurisprudence, which determined an actor’s liability for third-party content, based on the level of control
the actor exercised over it.42 The fact that a party exerted or could
exert control over third-party content led to the application of stricter liability standards.43
By passing § 230 of the CDA, Congress sought to overrule
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,44 in which an unidentified user defamed an investment firm on Prodigy’s “Money
Talk” bulletin board.45 The New York court decided that Prodigy
acted as a publisher when it screened some areas of its site to make
it family-friendly.46 Under common law defamation principles, the
court held that Prodigy, as a publisher, was liable for third-party
messages on its board, despite the lack of contribution to, notice of,
or knowledge of the postings’ improper nature.47 Prodigy’s goodfaith efforts to monitor its site resulted in increased liability.48 Legislators recognized the injustice of Stratton Oakmont and exempted
content providers from traditional publishers’ liability.49
Courts have interpreted § 230 broadly. Under § 230(c)(1), online service providers, including website operators, have enjoyed
immunity from primary and secondary liability for a wide variety of
claims. For example, in Zeran v. America Online, defamatory remarks against Zeran were posted on an AOL message board.50 An
40

See id.
Id. § 230(b)(1)–(2), (c)(1); Anupan Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63
EMORY L.J. 639, 652 (2014); Cecilia Ziniti, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service
Providers: How Zeran v. America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 583, 585 (2008).
42
See Ziniti, supra note 41, at 584.
43
Id.
44
See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *1
(Sup. Ct. May 25, 1995).
45
Id. at *3.
46
Id. at *18.
47
See id.
48
Id. at *2, *5, *7.
49
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
50
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328–29, 332 (4th Cir. 1997).
41
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anonymous user advertised that Zeran was selling shirts glorifying
the Oklahoma City bombing.51 The Fourth Circuit decided that
distributors were a subset of publishers and were thus immune
from liability, according to § 230.52 Under this reading, providers
maintain they have immunity, afforded by § 230, even if they refrained from taking an action after learning about potential illegal
content on their site.53
After Zeran, § 230 repeatedly shielded web enterprises from
lawsuits in a plethora of cases.54 Courts have found that content
providers that host harmful content are immune to liability,55 even
if they failed to screen harmful content,56 and even after being notified of the harmful content.57 In Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, the
Ninth Circuit relied on § 230 to deny Carafano’s lawsuit against
the owner of the dating website “Matchmaker” for speech
torts, despite the serious and utterly deplorable consequences that
occurred.58 Many times, courts have found content providers im-

51

Id. at 329.
Distributers fell under a category of defendants who faced liability upon knowledge
of offending content they distributed. The court held that § 230 precluded not just strict
liability as a publisher; it also precluded the application to website operators from
intermediate liability for distributors. Id. at 330.
53
As the Fourth Circuit noted in Zeran, a notice-and-takedown rule would lead
companies to remove controversial statements, rather than face liability. Id. at 333.
54
See Chander, supra note 41, at 653.
55
See Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 2015);
GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 756 (Tex. App. 2014).
56
See Hupp v. Freedom Commc’ns, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 4th 398 (2013) (applying
immunity to defamatory comments in an online edition of a newspaper, although the
content provider supervised the comments). Section 230 has protected Yelp, a consumer
reviews peer production site, from liability for user reviews. See Obado v. Magedson, No.
13-2382, 2014 WL 3778261, at *5 (D.N.J. July 31, 2014) (“[Section] 230 immunity
extends to the service provider’s decisions about how to treat potentially objectionable
material.”); see also Westlake Legal Grp. v. Schumacher, No. 1:14-cv-564, 2014 WL
4097643 (E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2014).
57
See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 n.4 (4th
Cir. 2009); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1017 (Fla. 2001). Content providers
that delayed removing harmful content after learning about it were found immune. See
Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Caraccioli v. Facebook,
Inc., No. 5:15-cv-04145, 2016 WL 859863 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2016).
58
See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com 339 F.3d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003). This case
involves not only defamation, but also impersonation. See Tal Z. Zarsky & Norberto
52
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mune even when they were negligent.59 Content providers were
also immune to liability when they knowingly declined requests of
the original publisher to remove the harmful content.60
Some judges criticized the immunity and tried to narrow it
down.61 They also tried to sidestep the immunity by employing various strategies.62 However, the immunity remains broad.
2. Europe
The framework for content providers’ liability in Europe is dictated by article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC (“E-Commerce Directive”), which provides that intermediaries engaged in “hosting”
are not liable, unless they have actual knowledge of illegal state-

Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Regulating Electronic Identity Intermediaries: The “Soft eID”
Conundrum, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1335, 1369 (2013).
59
See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co., Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 988
(10th Cir. 2000). Courts have also found content providers immune even if they paid
third parties to write columns on their platforms, which contained defamatory speech,
and even when they bought information from third parties and this information was
erroneous. See id.; Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51, 53 (D.D.C. 1998).
60
See Giordano v. Romeo, 76 So. 3d 1100, 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Glob.
Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 932 (D. Ariz. 2008).
61
See the criticism of Judge Easterbrook in Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th
Cir. 2003). According to Judge Easterbrook, the Zeran decision is flawed because its
interpretation frustrates the CDA’s stated purpose of encouraging self-regulation by
granting blanket immunity to Internet service providers regardless of their efforts. See id.
Judge Easterbrook provided an alternative interpretation for § 230, treating it as a
definition clause rather than immunity to liability. See id.
62
See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2009). The Barnes
court refused to hold Yahoo! liable for false accounts featuring Cecilia Barnes’ name and
nude pictures created by her ex-boyfriend, pursuant to § 230. Id. at 1105. However, the
court held Yahoo! liable for promissory estoppel, a subset theory of recovery based on a
breach of contract. Id. at 1109. In another famous case, the Ninth Circuit held that the
design of drop-down menus and other features contributed materially to an illegal action
and was essentially causing third parties to commit speech torts. Fair Housing Council v.
Roommates.com, LLC., 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th
Cir. 2008). Lately, the Ninth Circuit outlined a “failure to warn” exception to § 230
immunity. See Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 767 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g
granted, opinion withdrawn, 778 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2015); see also David S. Ardia, Free
Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 459 (2010); Varty
Defterderian, Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com: A New Path for Section 230
Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563, 547 (2009).
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ments or refuse to remove them upon obtaining that knowledge.63
In other words, content providers (hosts) are subjected to a noticeand-takedown rule, namely an obligation to remove problematic
content once a potential plaintiff brings its existence to their attention. According to article 15(1), member states should not impose a
general obligation on hosts to monitor the content they transmit
and store.64 These provisions impose a liability should the court
find that a content provider, regarded as a “host,” failed to
promptly comply with takedown requests or had actual knowledge
of the wrongdoing.65 Moreover, the Directive Recitals (article 47
and 48), indicate that Member States can impose specific—as opposed to general—monitoring obligations and, even more importantly, subject hosts to duties of care, “which can reasonably be
expected from them and which are specified by national law, in order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal activities.”66 Lastly, the Directive is somewhat dated and its classification might no
longer be comprehensive. Many content providers may not be
“hosts” at all.67 In such cases, the Directive’s restrictions would
not apply.
Outside the scope of the E-Commerce Directive, the potential
liability of content providers is extensive. Thus, for example, the
Estonian Supreme Court found the popular Delfi news website liable for defamatory statements about a famous Estonian business
63

Directive 2000/31/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic
Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter E-Commerce
Directive]. The directive was absorbed into particular legislation of the member states.
See Broder Kleinschmidt, An International Comparison of ISP’s Liabilities for Unlawful
Third Party Content, 18 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 332, 345–48 (2010); Joris van Hoboken,
Legal Space For Innovative Ordering: On the Need to Update Selection Intermediary Liability
in the EU, 13 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2009).
64
See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-12006; see also
Perry & Zarsky, Liability for Online Anonymous Speech, supra note 4.
65
See E-Commerce Directive, supra note 63, at 6.
66
Id.; THIBAULT VERBIEST ET AL., STUDY ON THE LIABILITY OF INTERNET
INTERMEDIARIES 5 n.22 (2007).
67
See Perry & Zarsky, Liability for Online Anonymous Speech, supra note 4; Peggy
Valcke & Marieke Lenaerts, Who’s Author, Editor and Publisher in UGC Content? Applying
Traditional Media Concepts to UGC Providers, 24 INT’L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 119,
126 (2010).
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executive.68 Anonymous users posted the statements on the comment section following an article about his business ventures.69 The
court here interpreted the Directive narrowly and found Delfi liable
even though it followed the notice-and-takedown practice and
complied with the requirements of the E.U. Directive.70 The court
held that Delfi could not benefit from the safe haven of the directive because by allowing comments from unregistered users the site
is liable as a publisher.71
Delfi filed a complaint against the decision to the European
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), claiming that its right to
freedom of expression was violated.72 The First Section of the
ECtHR disagreed.73 It upheld the Estonian court’s ruling and
found it a proportional interference with freedom of expression according to article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.74
Delfi appealed to the Grand Chamber.75 In a very long decision,
the appellate court confirmed the previous chamber decision.76
The decision generated substantial confusion regarding the distinc-

68

Delphi AS v. Estonia (Delphi I), App. No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013).
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
See id. The court here applied a narrow interpretation for intermediaries’ technical
functions. For expansion on this, see Martin Husovec, ECtHR Rules on Liability of ISPs as
a Restriction of Freedom of Speech, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 108, 109 (2014).
75
The Helsinky Foundation for Human Rights and Digital Media Association joined to
the appeal as amicus curiae. See Brief for The Helsinky Foundation for Human Rights as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Delphi I, App. No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R.; Brief
for European Digital Media Association, CCIA, and EuroISPA as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Delphi I, App. No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. Other
organizations, such as Access, Article 19, and Media Legal defense, also intervened as
third parties. See Delphi AS v. Estonia (Delphi II), App. No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2015).
76
See Delphi II, App. No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. After assessing the lawfulness of
intervention with freedom of expression, its legitimacy, and the necessity of interference
in a democratic society, the Grand Chamber affirmed the outcome and the reasoning of
the lower court, albeit not unanimously. Id. at paras. 120–39.
69
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tions between online ‘publishers’ and mere intermediaries.77 The
extent of notice-and-takedown provisions also remains unclear.78
After Delfi, in Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, the ECtHR reached a different conclusion
regarding the violation of article 10. Yet, it did not retreat from the
decision in Delfi. Rather it differentiated the nature of the comments which were published from the comments in Delfi.79 As reflected by other tribunal’s decisions the E-Commerce Directive’s
safe haven is eroding.80
The difference between the laws in the European Union and
the United States reflects a divergent understanding of freedom of
speech. This difference was also reflected in the liability of search
engines and the interpretation of Directive 95/46/EC (“Data Protection Directive”).81 The European Court of Justice backed the
“right to be forgotten”82 in Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de
77

See Perry & Zarsky, Liability for Online Anonymous Speech, supra note 4, at 16.
See id.
79
See Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, App. No.
22947/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. 135 (2016). The court noted that the nature of the comments was
different, regarded the article as a matter of public interest and the fact that the article did
not provoke the offensive comments. Id. at para. 72. Thus, the conclusion and result of
exempting the intermediary from liability may be confined to the individual circumstances
of this particular case. Id. at para. 64; id. at para. 4 (Kuris, J., concurring).
80
See Italy Fines TripAdvisor €500,000 over False Reviews, GUARDIAN (Dec. 23, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/travel/2014/dec/23/italy-fines-tripadvisor-500000
[https://perma.cc/7DB9-EXP6]. The antitrust authority found that insufficient efforts
were made to stop false reviews after hoteliers and consumer group complained. Id.
81
Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection
Directive].
82
This right, now branded as the “right to erasure,” was represented as one of the
“four pillars” of the new Regulation in the European Union. In October 2013, the
European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs considered
and consolidated nearly four thousand proposed amendments to the Commission
Proposal into a new proposal that was adopted by the Committee.
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data (General Data Protection), COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)
(Oct. 17, 2013). For more expansion, see NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY:
RETHINKING DIGITAL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 91 (2015); Steven C. Bennett, The
“Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161,
78
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Protección de Datos.83 The court here ruled that search engines are
responsible for search results linking to personal data, which appears on webpages published by third parties.84
The court reached this conclusion by broadly interpreting the
term “controller” in from the Data Protection Directive.85 The
court affirmed that search engines are data processors and controllers when they index personal data published on websites.86 However, the decision referred the Data Protection Directive, not the
E-Commerce Directive.87
The relation between the obligations of a search engine provider as a controller and the safe haven principles of the E-Commerce
Directive is not elaborated and the scope of providers’ liability remains unclear.88
169 (2012); Ignacio Cofone, Google v. Spain: A Right To Be Forgotten?, 15 CHI.-KENT J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 9–10 (2015); Cooper Mitchell-Rekurt, Search Engine Liability Under
the Libe Data Regulation Proposal: Interpreting Third Party Responsibilities as Informed by
Google Spain, 45 GEO. J. INT’L 861 (2014); Abraham L. Newman, What the “Right to be
Forgotten” Means for Privacy in a Digital Age, SCI. 1 (2015); see generally Jeffrey Rosen, The
Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2012).
83
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014
E.C.R. 317.
84
To comply with the judgment, Google offered E.U. citizens the ability to file data
removal requests. See Anupan Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Free Speech, 100 IOWA L. REV. 501,
541 (2015). Within twenty-four hours, the search engine received right to be forgotten
requests from at least twelve thousand individuals. See id.
85
Data Protection Directive, supra note 81.
86
See Google Spain SL, 2014 e.C.R. 317, at para. 41 (“Article 2(b) and (d) of Directive
95/46 are to be interpreted as meaning that, first, the activity of a search engine consisting
in finding information published or placed on the internet by third parties, indexing it
automatically, storing it temporarily and, finally, making it available to internet users
according to a particular order of preference must be classified as ‘processing of personal
data’ within the meaning of Article 2(b) when that information contains personal data
and, second, the operator of the search engine must be regarded as the ‘controller’ in
respect of that processing, within the meaning of Article 2(d).”).
For criticism on the interpretation of the European Court of Justice, see Javier
Aparicio Salom, “A Third Party to Whom Data are Disclosed”: A Third Group Among Those
Processing Data, INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 1, 11 (2014).
87
Google Spain SL, 2014 E.C.R. 317.
88
See Ioannis Iglezakis, The Right to Be Forgotten in the Google Spain Case (Case C131/12): A Clear Victory for Data Protection or an Obstacle for the Internet?, 4th INT’L CONF.
INFO. L. (2014); Miquel Peguera, The Shaky Ground of the Right to be Delisted, 18 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 507 (2016). Characterizing search engines as controllers imply that they
are not neutral and passive enough to be eligible for the protection of the safe haven. Yet,

2016]

CONTENT PROVIDERS’ SECONDARY LIABILITY

875

a) England
England presents a unique model due to the new Defamation
Act of 2013.89 Section 5 of the Act states that a victim who can file
an action against the speaker may not be permitted to sue the content provider as well.90 The section provides that a website operator is not liable for a defamatory statement posted on the website if
it did not post that statement.91 This defense can be defeated, however, if the victim has insufficient information to identify and bring
proceedings against the speaker; or if the victim gave notice of
complaint, and the content provider did not respond to the victims’ complaint.92 Thus, content providers’ liability is residual and
generally they will not be liable for the defamatory speech if they
did not act as publishers.93
However, in Tamiz v. Google, Inc.,94 which was decided shortly
before the law was passed, the court took an expansive view of the
term “publisher.”95 It determined that an operator of a blog service
might be responsible for a comment on a blog post, even if the

the “right to be forgotten” is limited in scope, the European Court of Justice confined the
discussion to searches made by the name of an individual and asserted only a right to
delist the link—as opposed to a right to remove the information from the search engine’s
index altogether. See id.
89
Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 (Eng.). This law came into force on January 1, 2014. See
MATTHEW COLLINS, COLLINS ON DEFAMATION 1.41–.61, 15.01–.16 (2014).
90
Defamation Act, § 5.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Section 5 provides that a website operator is generally not liable for a defamatory
statement posted on the website if it was not the one who posted that statement. The
[defense] can be defeated, however, if the victim has insufficient information to identify
and bring proceedings against the speaker, the victim gave notice of complaint, and the
content provider did not respond to the victim’s complaint in accordance with the
Defamation (Operators of Websites) Regulations. If the content provider cannot contact
the speaker, if the speaker does not respond or does not provide the required information
(including personal name and address), or if he or she agrees to removal, the allegedly
defamatory content should be removed immediately. Otherwise, the content provider
need not remove the content, and may provide the speaker’s contact information to the
victim if the former consents or if a court orders it to do so. Perry & Zarsky, Liability fo
Online Anonymous Speech, supra note 4, at 19.
94
Tamiz v. Google, Inc. [2013] EWCA (Civ) 68 [34]–[36] (Eng.).
95
Id.
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blogger removed the harmful content.96 The court stated that the
operator of a blog (Google) might be liable for the defamatory
comment from the time it received a notice about the harmful content until it was removed from the service.97 The court reasoned
that since Google allowed users to design blogs, and it made profits
from advertisements, it is also liable.98 Yet, in this specific case, the
court found that given the limited time between notification and
removal, there had been no substantial damage.99 The court’s
broad recognition of publisher liability undermined the arrangement in the Defamation Act. Thus, it might be possible to sue content providers without taking an action against the original speaker.100
3. Canada
Canada does not have a legal framework as the abovementioned E.U. Directive. Therefore, content providers do not
benefit from any safe haven. Liability is regulated by common law
and the rules applying to distributors.101 Accordingly, the “innocent dissemination” defense protects those who play a secondary
role in the chain of distribution. This defense absolves distributors
from liability, provided they have had no knowledge of the defamatory nature of the statement, and that their failure to detect the de96

See id. In this case, the victim of a comment on “Blogger” notified Google of a
defamatory comment about him. Id. ¶ 2. After a few e-mail exchanges between Google
and the specific blogger, the latter removed the comment voluntarily. Id. However, five
weeks passed from the exchanges to the removal. Id. ¶ 35. The court stated that,
regarding this time period, Google might be liable as a publisher. Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
The court did not find the content provider liable because by the time the plaintiff
sent his notification, the defamatory comments had receded into history by other
comments. Id. ¶ 50. Therefore, any damage that may have been caused to the appellant’s
reputation was trivial. See id.
100
See Perry & Zarsky, Liability fo Online Anonymous Speech, supra note 4, at 6. Broadly
speaking, where an Internet intermediary knows or ought to be aware of the content of the
article, and has a realistic ability to control publication of such content, the intermediary is
considered the publisher of the content. See CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS ¶¶ 22–60
(21st ed., 2014).
101
Corey Omer, Intermediary Liability for Harmful Speech: Lessons from Abroad, 28
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 289, 305 (2014).
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famatory content was not due to negligence.102 The burden of proof
is on the defendant.103
Different countries applied different liability regimes for regulating content providers. Even in the same country, the courts can
apply different standards of liability. A lack of a coherent legal thesis explains the different approaches towards the issue. Deciding
when content providers should be liable for defamatory speech on
their platforms involves policy considerations, which I will discuss
in the following Sections.
D. Normative Considerations
Liability of content providers lies on the junction of several
branches of law. It balances constitutional rights and general tort
considerations. In addition, the technological context involves special considerations.
1. Constitutional Balance and the Base of Speech Torts
The civil rights concerning content providers liability in speech
torts are: human dignity, reputation interests, and freedom of
speech. The standard of liability shapes civil rights online and
strikes the balance between the right to free expression and human
dignity.
The first consideration is the dignity of the persons affected by
the offensive speech, namely their social standing, their recognition
as equals, bearers of human rights, and constitutional entitlements.
Liability for defamation brings to public awareness “the basic elements of each person’s status, dignity, and reputation as a member
of society.”104

102

Id. at 305–06.
See id.; Niemela v. Malamas, 2015 BCSC 1024, at paras. 94–99 (Can.); Crookes v.
Newton, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 (Can.); DAVID A POTTS, CYBERLIBEL: INFORMATION
WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 279–81 (2011); Andrew Bernstein & Rima Ramchandani,
Don’t Shoot the Messenger! A Discussion of ISP Liability, 1 CAN. J.L. & TECH., no. 2, 2002,
at 77, 79.
104
Peter G. Danchin, Defaming Muhammad: Dignity, Harm, and Incitement to Religious
Hatred, 2 DUKE F.L. & SOC. CHANGE 5, 17 (2010).
103
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The other consideration is the right to free speech. The right to
free speech protects public communication and shields against
government censorship.105 But now, many scholars believe that free
speech is threatened by private entities as well.106 In the United
States, the freedom of speech is protected more than in other western democracies.107 Courts and scholars have developed numerous
theories about why free speech should receive special protection.108
The first rationale supporting free speech is that it promotes
individual autonomy and self-fulfillment. It allows the selfdetermination of an individual.109 As a result, freedom of speech
must be assured to anyone. The content is left to the discretion of
the speaker.110 Censorship expresses disapproval of particular
speech and the way of life of the speaker.111 The second rationale
for protecting free speech is the search for truth. The freedom ensures that every expression enters the marketplace of ideas.112 The
third rationale is the understanding that free speech is crucial for
maintaining a democracy. Freedom of speech is required to assure
the effectiveness of the democratic process by informing the governed of the acts of government and guaranteeing that policy is
reached intelligently.113 Contemporary theories of democracy focus
on protecting and promoting a democratic participatory culture.
Freedom of speech is required to assure an individual’s ability to
participate in the production and distribution of culture.114 These
105

Michael D. Birnhack, More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF

THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 59, 64 (2006).
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RICHARDS, supra note 82, at 10.
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See generally Joseph Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, 11 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 303 (1991).
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Id. at 303, 313–16.
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Birnhack, supra note 105, at 66.
111
Raz, supra note 108, at 312.
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JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 5–9 (1869); JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A
SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING (1958). The theory was popularized
by Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919). See also RICHARDS, supra note 82, at 35; Birnhack, supra note 105, at 68.
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Birnhack, supra note 105, at 71; ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1965).
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Jack Balkin, Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the
Information Society, N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004); Birnhack, supra note 105, at 71.
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theories stress both individual liberty and collective selfgovernance.
The digital age places freedom of speech and its underlying justifications in a new light. It pushes the freedom of expression to the
forefront, reminding the public of old concerns regarding expression that has become central and relevant to policy-issue makers.115
The law often limits the liability of content providers for the
speech they carry, because by imposing liability on them, they
might be induced to filter out questionable content. A content provider loses little from the removal of user-generated content. Yet,
each comment increases his or her exposure to liability. Thus, he or
she would rather remove suspected items than face penalties.116
This “collateral censorship” risk would lead to the suppression of
lawful, even highly beneficial, speech and could result in a “chilling
effect.”117
The Internet, however, can also reduce the cost of destructive
activities and minimize the cost of anti-social behavior. It allows
geographically disparate people to combine their efforts into powerful force and amplify the severity of harm. Thus, libel on the
Internet might cause even more severe damage to a person’s reputation and dignity. Exempting content providers from liability
would deny victims their ability to engage with others as equals,
which might in some cases even suppress a free public debate. In
fact, exempting content providers from liability would not only
harm victims’ autonomy, but also the free market of ideas and public participation.118 Thus, the balancing act of this tort must also
include the victims’ freedom of expression and the constitutional
rights in question are related to both parties.
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Balkin, supra note 114, at 3.
See Hamdani, supra note 31, at 931; Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe
Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 114 (2007).
117
See Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV.
2296, 2309 (2014); Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary
Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 318 (2011).
118
See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 2, at 191–200. These
conclusions are reinforced due to the magnitude of information that is being transmitted.
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2. Theories of Traditional Tort Law
a) Corrective Justice
A central justification for imposing liability is corrective justice.
According to Aristotelian philosophy, corrective justice is defined
as a rectification of harm, wrongfully caused by one person to another, by means of a direct transfer of resources from the injurer to the
victim.119 Accordingly, every particular interaction embodies correlative rights and duties that are imposed on both parties. This
deontological non-consequentialist concept focuses on bilateral interactions, which are not reliant on external values.
Corrective justice theorists offer explanations regarding the duty of rectification. For example, Jules L. Coleman concentrates on
fault and rights.120 Ernest J. Weinrib and Stephen R. Perry concentrate on responsibility.121 George P. Fletcher claims that the basis
for liability is non-reciprocal risk.122 Thus, liability exists when a
respondent generates a disproportionate, excessive risk for harm,
relative to the victim’s risk-creating activity. The entitlement to
recover a loss is given to all those injured by utilizing non-reciprocal
risks. The goal is to distinguish between the risks that violate individual interests and background risks that must be borne by society.123 Theorists explain that causation is not enough for imposition

119

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1130 (William David Ross trans., 1980).
See Jules L. Colman, Risks and Wrongs, YALE L. SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
REPOSITORY, Jan. 1, 1992, at 324–60; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective
Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 718 (2003).
121
Weinrib highlights correlativity by pointing out that tort doctrine constructs the tort
relationship because liability treats the parties as doer and sufferer of the same injustice.
See Ariel Porat, Questioning the Idea of Correlativity in Weinrib’s Theory of Corrective
Justice, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 161, 169 (2001); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral
Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 489–94 (1992); Stephen R. Perry, The
Impossibility of General, Strict Liability, 1 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 147, 151 (1998); Ernest J.
Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 107, 110 (2001).
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George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 537–64
(1972).
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of liability.124 Consequently, fault (negligence or moral fault) must
exist in order to justify compensation for the harm caused.125
In light of the bilateral correlative nature of torts, the literature
on corrective justice tended to focus on “first order” liability (the
liability of those who most directly and wrongfully caused an injury) and not on “second order” liability. However, one may argue
that content providers create the framework for risk by allowing the
activity and assisting it. Therefore, providers should be liable for
the consequences alongside the direct wrongdoer, because a corrective justice concept is also feasible when several wrongdoers
caused the harm.126
On the other hand, one may argue that designing and operating
platforms is merely a background risk. As such, content providers
(platforms as Yelp and Facebook) do not commit speech torts
themselves, and, therefore, they bear no fault to the harm caused.
Instead, the user who defamed the third party would be at fault.
According to this approach, it is not fair and just to impose liability
on content providers.
b) Efficiency
This significant perspective focuses on the maximization of
wealth and the efficient allocation of risks. In general, it does not
take into account deontological considerations.127 According to this

124

See supra note 121.
Theorist Richard Epstein believes that harm justifies compensation. Richard
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 151, 157 (1973). This theory of strict
liability, which focuses on factual causality, is unacceptable and came under criticism. See
Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 63–68 (1980).
126
Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A
Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1162 (1988). In that case, every wrongdoer is liable to the plaintiff’s
damages and can claim subrogation from other wrongdoers.
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Richard Allen Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of Efficiency Norm in Common
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 492 (1980).
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perspective, legal rules aim to incentivize efficient conduct ex-ante
and promote welfare maximization ex-post facto.128
Scholarly literature usually deals with the economic analysis of
direct liability, but shies away from discussing third party liability.
However, in some cases expanding liability to third parties is required when: (1) the enforcement of liability on the direct tortfeasor fails (for example, when the direct tortfeasor cannot be detected); (2) the third-party can monitor and control the direct
wrongdoers; (3) sufficient incentives do not exist for private ordering and non-legal strategies; and (4) a legal rule can be applied at
reasonable a cost.129 While third-party liability is well established,
little is known about its appropriate scope. Specifically, legal scholarship has little to say about the standard of liability that should
apply to third parties.130
In our context, enforcement failure might occur,131 because the
speaker might be anonymous, and even if he is identified, he might
not be deep-pocketed. To whom should liability be allocated? Who
is the cheapest cost avoider? Who should bear the burden of minimizing speech torts’ harms? In the following subsections, I shall
examine whether efficiency considerations support imposing liability on content providers, considering the alternative of letting the
victim bear the damage. I will refer to the implication of assigning
liability on content providers and focus on three types of traditional
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John R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON J. 646 (1939);
Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions for Economics and Inter Personal Comparisons of
Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939).
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Douglas G. Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable
(John M. Olin Program in L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 217, 2004); see also Reinier H.
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of Third—Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 53, 53 (1986); Alan Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis
of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 564
(1988); Alan Sykes, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law of Agency, 91
YALE L.J. 168, 168 (1981).
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Asaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 57 (2003).
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Matthew Schruers, The History and Economics of ISP Liability for Third Party Content,
88 VA. L. REV. 205, 233 (2002).
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costs associated with it: primary costs of deterrence, secondary
costs of loss spreading,132 and administrative litigation costs.
One may argue that content providers are the cheapest cost
avoiders of speech torts. They can easily control content on their
platform. Imposing liability would incentivize providers to monitor
content on their platform and filter out offensive materials. This
would improve enforcement and minimize libel that causes more
harm than good.133 Waiving the liability of content providers in fact
disincentivizes them from taking precautions, which is reflected in
inefficient enforcement.134 In addition, content providers have deeper pockets than individuals in theory and, therefore, are better
suited than the victim to reduce secondary costs by bearing the loss
or spreading it on their users. An increase in administrative litigation costs should be expected, but imposing liability on content
providers is better than the alternative of leaving the victim without
a remedy. This alternative will not bring an efficient deterrence and
may impose on the victim heavy secondary costs.
However, in-depth examination reveals that efficiency considerations fail to provide answers regarding the allocation of liability.
When taking into account overall market characteristics, content
providers are not the cheapest cost avoiders. Unlike traditional
media, Internet content providers do not have the time or the resources to review and check every expression on their platform in
real time.135 Since user-generated content is great and existing
models are based on extensive accessibility of information, liability
would burden the rapid flow of information and free speech, thus
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Secondary costs are the costs associated with bearing losses. See GUIDO CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 38 (1970). Significant
losses borne by one person are more likely to result in secondary losses (arising from the
initial damage) than allocating a series of small losses to many people, or large sum of
losses to deep-pocketed entities. Id.
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See Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Imposing a Duty in an Online World: Holding the Web Host
Liable for Cyberbullying, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 277 (2013).
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See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY
ON THE INTERNET 159 (2007); Lichtman & Posner, supra note 129.
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For illustration, YouTube users now upload 100 hours of video every minute. See
supra note 33.
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harming aggregated wealth.136 Therefore, the existing model should
be preserved and the allocation of risks should fall on the victim’s
shoulders. Expanding responsibilities to content providers (third
parties) is not desirable because the utility achieved by improving
deterrence in the relevant market would be probably lower than its
costs.
Imposing legal liability on content providers might not be necessary, since the reputation of a provider is damaged when a user
disseminates defaming speech on their platforms. Reputation loss
often translates into profit loss, fear of which might provide sufficient incentives for private ordering content review.
Allocating liability to content providers may also increase secondary costs of spread loss. Erroneous assessment of secondary
liability risks may lead content providers to increase their service
prices disproportionately. Content providers are not born equally,
and they do not all have deep pockets. For example, it would be
inefficient to impose liability on non-commercial providers. As
noted above, allocating liability to content providers would cause
an increase in legal action and rising administrative costs. These
different considerations make it difficult to assess the most efficient
allocation of liability.
c) Efficiency and Technological Innovation
In the digital age, I cannot discuss allocation of liability without
referring to technological innovation. The liability regime taxes innovation and influences its course.137 The expected liability outcome ex post facto influences investments in certain types of tech136

New technology can filter some forms of speech automatically, but it is prone to
making mistakes and sometimes over-filtering because expression depends on context.
See Lital Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technology Standard, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1194, 1234 (2011).
137
Evidence shows that under liberal liability regimes, innovation thrives; too heavy of a
burden of liability may stifle innovation. See Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and
Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1241, 1241 (2012); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 285, 314 (2008); Guy Pessach, Deconstructing Disintermediation: A Skeptical
Copyright Perspective, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 833, 864 (2013). The liability regime
may affect market innovation and social innovation. See Tal Zarsky, The Privacy–
Innovation Conundrum, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 115, 126 (2015).
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nologies and the adopted business models,138 both of which play an
important role in determining efficiency.
One might argue that a liability rule enabling freedom and
openness incentivizes entrepreneurs to invest in technological ventures and digital markets. Exempting content providers from liability would incentivize the development of many platforms and promote efficient diversity and optimal investment decisions. Stricter
liability, however, might stifle innovation. It might impede the significant technological progress witnessed in recent years, including
the increase in productivity and personal satisfaction.139
Yet, a counter argument might point out that anyone who conducts business of any complexity must consult with a lawyer at
some point regarding the liability risks. In some cases, despite formidable legal regulations, innovation continues. Thus, the concern
of impeding innovation might be over-stated.140 Since it is impossible to tell which technologies are abandoned due to the adopted
liability rule, I would leave this question open without a conclusion.141
E. Interim Summary: From a Global to a Particular Regulation
The examination of various liability regimes in different countries reveals that they are either over- or under-inclusive. Allowing
complete immunity to providers is difficult to defend, since it

138
See Dotan Oliar, The Copyright Innovation Trade-off: Property Rules, Liability Rules
and Intentional Infliction of Harm, 64 STAN. L. REV. 951, 1000 (2012); Pessach, supra note
137, at 864 (noting that YouTube’s success was due to the copyright liability regime
(notice-and-takedown)). By and in itself, such a regime does not prevent the popularity of
a platform and the variety of popular copyrighted content that it hosts on the site.
139
See ANUPAN CHANDER, THE SILVER SILK ROAD 57 (2013); Yochai Benkler,
Decentralization, Freedom to Operate & Human Society, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE:
ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 257, 263 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds.,
2011); Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 WIS. L. REV.
891, 942 (2012); see generally Chander, supra note 41.
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Alex Kozinsky & Josh Goldfoot, A Declaration of the Dependence of Cyberspace, in THE
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176.
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might be over-inclusive142 and might also cause disincentives for
better behavior by those in the best position to minimize harm.
Such immunity can foster irresponsibility, increase harm to reputation, and undermine the victims’ freedom of expression.143
Distributor-style negligence liability is over-inclusive.144 It
might cause over deterrence and undermine free speech, efficiency, and innovation. Negligence standards are open standards. Interpreting them involves cumbersome litigation and high administrative costs. In addition, courts are prone to decide inconsistently,
and they might find it difficult to conduct cost-benefit analyses,
resulting in uncertainty.145 Negligence regime may also lead to
hindsight and outcome biases, because reasonable action is normally decided after the fact.146 Consequently, courts may conclude that
the content provider had been negligent even if he could not predict the harm ex ante and acted reasonably. The end result of this
regime might lead to a serious chilling effect of a defensive takedown policy, or switching off reader comments sections. 147
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See Lichtman & Posner, supra note 129, at 28. Shifting the full costs of accidents to
content providers’ subscribers would inefficiently reduce their incentives to take care,
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143
See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 2, at 193–99; Citron, Cyber
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Publisher-style strict liability would cause over-deterrence as
well and would increase the cost of efficient conduct.148 This liability regime is not suitable for online content providers;149 and in fact,
it would lead to a severe “chilling effect” in comparison to other
regimes.
A safe-haven provision for entities that take specific precautionary steps (“notice and takedown”) is a compromise that offers
many advantages. Under this regime, content providers do not
have to filter content and are not liable to harmful content they
were not informed about. Content providers who fail to remove
harmful materials after notification are exposed to liability. This
legal framework incentivizes content providers to implement private enforcement measures. However, this regime might result in
the removal of any content in response to complaints, even if it is
not defamatory. The chilling effect of this system may manifest itself in the form of a veto power granted to anyone who has an interest to silence speech, including legitimate criticism. And it may
also promote mass censorship.150 For example, rating and review
websites would turn into praise websites under this regime, thereby
making them irrelevant. As a result, consumers will probably lose
an important and efficient tool in their decision-making process.
Technological and regulatory mechanisms may solve the abovementioned problems in various liability regimes: for example,
imposing transparency obligations on content providers. These obligations would require providers to articulate the rules for filtering
content. This strategy might decrease distortions caused by filtering and enable users to understand the extent of censorship. Subjected to transparency and disclosure, content providers might reduce unnecessary filtering in order to preserve their reputation as a
148
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150
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rich market of ideas.151 In addition, rules might require content
providers to implement mechanisms, which enable users to participate in regulation, such as interfaces for labeling and reporting
harmful content.152 However, the efficiency of these measures is
doubtful.153
I believe that a single, overarching regime regulating content
providers’ liability cannot balance properly the above-mentioned
normative considerations. It would be insensitive to different online contexts and lead to distortions and improper consequences.
Instead, context-based regimes are more useful in this regard. Liability influenced by context has been recognized in legal thinking
for many years, and perhaps it should be applied online as well.154
151

Tal Zarsky, Transparency in Content Filtering: A Plan of Attack, 2 HEBREW U. L.J.
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In the following pages, I shall distinguish between online contexts
and suggest different nuanced liability regimes, leading to an optimal balance between constitutional rights, fairness, economic efficiency, and technological innovation.
II. SOCIAL NETWORK PERSPECTIVE: STRONG TIES, WEAK
TIES, SOCIOLOGICAL DISTINCTIONS, AND TYPES OF
DISCOURSE
Since an overarching regime regulating content providers’ liability is flawed, it is necessary to distinguish between the types of
content providers and outline the possible differential liability regimes. I offer a descriptive taxonomy based on sociology rather
than technology. It distinguishes online platforms based on the
strength of ties formed within them.
A sociological analysis facilitates an understanding of social
networks and the strength of ties formed within. It also helps to
predict which online settings form strong ties. This new taxonomy
serves as the first step towards applying a differential regime for
regulating content providers liability, which shall culminate in a
practical method to settle fundamental legal dilemmas.
A. A Basic Network Perspective: Towards a Contextual Taxonomy
Social networks seem to organize social life today.155 They
spread happiness, generosity, and love. They are always there, exerting both subtle and dramatic influence over our choices, actions,
thoughts, feelings, and even our desires. Social networks can affect
the full spectrum of human experience. The ties formed within
them are crucial to understanding how networks function and the
way information is shared and circulated within them.156 Through

(1989); see also Musetta Durkee, The Truth Can Catch the Lie: The Flawed Understanding of
Online Speech in In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773, 777
(2011).
155
Manuel Castells, Afterword: Why Networks Matter, in NETWORK LOGIC: WHO
GOVERNS IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD? 221 (2004).
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the prisms of social networks, a new understanding of social dynamics and information can be identified.
Network theory describes the relations between discrete objects: how they connect and how those connections are created,
grow, and change.157 Sociologists are concerned with social networks and their effect on communication patterns. Their focus is
on the ties between individuals rather than what they think or do
on their own.158 These ties influence interactions and information
exchanges between individuals. The strength of these ties range from
weak to strong.
A few decades ago, researchers identified various ties of different strengths, mapping their features and meaning. Mark Granovetter, a pioneer in this field, laid the foundation for the distinction
between strong and weak ties.159 Strong ties are characterized by
four factors: (1) time and duration of the relationship; (2) emotional intensity; (3) intimacy (social confiding); and (4) reciprocity.
Each of these factors is independent of the other, though the set is
intra-related.160 The strength of ties influences characteristics of
relationships and implicates information flows through them.
Weak ties are usually circumstantial and connect heterogeneous acquaintances from different social circles. Strong ties, on the
other hand, usually connect homogenous individuals, characterized
by social similarity and overlapping social circles. Different ties
157
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REV. 359, 365 (2003).

2016]

CONTENT PROVIDERS’ SECONDARY LIABILITY

891

thus fulfill different functions. Weak ties are particularly instrumental. They function quite well at bridging non-overlapping information pools and facilitating searches for impersonal standalone information.161 Information carried through them is widespread. However, they are not a particularly successful means of
transmitting complex personal knowledge. In contrast, information
transmitted via strong ties might be complex and personal. It generally spreads less quickly, but is more accurate and credible.162
B. Sociology: Not Technology
This Article focuses on digital networks. Yet, the proposed taxonomy is based on sociological analysis, rather than technology. At
first glance, this strategy might seem surprising. A technologybased approach, imposing liability rules depending on technology,
might appear more effective. However, this is not the case for three
reasons. First, technology develops unexpectedly and changes faster than the legislative process.163 A technology-based regulation is
bound to become obsolete and might not fit the next innovation.
The outcome would result with uncertainty and confusion. Second,
a technology-based approach might have a negative effect on innovation and bar progress.164 Third, a technology specific regulation
might promote technological solutions that would circumvent statutory limitations.165

161

Weak ties are particularly important in spreading gossip and news. The chief
advantage of information diffusion through weak ties stems from the rapidity with which
information is transmitted between different close-knit groups. See Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 955 (2005).
162
See Strahilevitz, supra note 161, at 956.
163
NICHOLAS CARR, THE GLASS CAGE: AUTOMATION AND US 40 (2014); Peter F.
Drucker, The New Society of Organizations, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1992, at 95, 96
(“It is the nature of knowledge that it changes fast and that today’s certainties always
become tomorrow’s absurdities.”).
164
See Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Information Privacy Law, 15 YALE J. L. &
TECH. 24, 39 (2013).
165
For example, The U.S. recording industry’s trade association sued Napster. See
Zittrain, supra note 13, at 274. The lengthy litigation itself spawned a number of new
technologies to fill in Napster’s shoes, which resulted in a new round of lawsuits designed
to stymie Napster’s successors. See id.
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The preference of the sociological approach is not arbitrary. On
the contrary, applying social network theory to assist regulating
speech torts is natural. In fact, there are significant justifications for
preferring social context based taxonomy to any other classification. Speech torts are not committed in a vacuum. In most circumstances, we hear the social context of speech, as much as we understand the content of communication. Thus, defamation is often in
the ear of the listener, depending on context.166
Reliance on social contexts is rooted in defamation law.167
When determining the level of damages, courts take into account
the seriousness of defamation and the nature and extent of publication.168 Other relevant factors include the prominence of the publication, the credence recipients ascribe to it and the parties’ (speaker and victim) conduct.169 These factors are fundamentally related
to the structure of the network and social contexts of the flow of
information. The strength of the social ties affects social structures
and influences the perception of speech by the recipients. The
speaker and recipient’s conduct is also affected by social dynamics
within the social network. Thus, the strength of ties affects the
gravity of the harm to reputation.
166

See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Ollman test
requires consideration of a statement’s precision, verifiability, literary context and social
context when separating fact from opinion. See COLLINS, supra note 89, at 8.43–.55
(addressing the role of context in interpreting defenses); see also Brooks Fuller, Evaluating
Intent in True Threats Cases: The Importance of Context in Analyzing Threatening Internet
Messages, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 37, 40 (2015) (noting the importance of
context in interpreting a threatening Internet message); Rodney W. Ott, Fact and Opinion
in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative Power of Context, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 762
(1990); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L REV. 603, 640
(1990). Recently, the Supreme Court overturned a conviction regarding online threats,
preferring narrow subjective interpretation of context. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S.
Ct. 2001, 2016 (2015). However, this narrow approach stems from the focus on general
criminal principles. See id.
167
See COLLINS, supra note 89, at 6.29 (noting that the context in which the statement
made is relevant in ascertaining whether it conveys defamatory meaning). Thus, even
offensive, appalling, and outrageous statements may have no capacity to affect the
attitude of others towards a claimant if those to whom they were published dismissed
them as part of a rough tumble of the context in which they were made. See id.
168
See id.
169
See id. at 21.4–.7.
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C. The Quality of Online Ties
Networks have always existed, but the networks we form today
exploit different tools and operate in a different environment. The
triple revolution of the Internet, mobile phones, and social network
sites upgraded our ability to stay in touch with one another. This
revolution afforded new opportunities to form social ties, share
ideas, form communities, and engage in diverse social dynamics
anywhere, anytime.170
After showing that strong ties can be formed online,171 sociologists characterized the factors that online ties depend on. Based on
empirical studies and findings, Professors Gusstavo Mesch and Ilan
Talmud mapped three social factors affecting the quality of online
ties: (1) social similarity (homophily); (2) duration of the relationship; and (3) multiplexity (different dimensions of relationship).172
Thus, online ties, similarly to offline ties, include many types of
interactions and allow emotional support. Ongoing relationships
generate a shared history, and they reinforce a sense of belonging,
shared identity, as well as trust.173
The Internet is not a monolithic medium. It consists of many
platforms and different types of ties. Applying the social factors
laid by Mesh and Talmud (similarity, duration, and multiplexity)
enables one to predict the strength of ties formed in practice within
different platforms and online contexts. Thus, platforms facilitating
170

See CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 156, at 275; RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note
158, at 126.
171
See Sara Kiesler & Lee Sproul, Reducing Social Context Cues: Electronic Mail in
Organizational Communication, 32 MGMT. SCI. 1492, 1497 (1986) (reaching the conclusion
that the creation of strong ties is impossible online). On the other hand, many studies
concluded that strong ties can be formed on the Internet. See, e.g., Richard L. Daft &
Robert H. Lengel, Organizational Information Requirements Media Richness and Structural
Design, 32 MGMT. SCI. 554 (1986); see also Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin & James
M. Cook, Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 415, 418
(2001). For an extensive review, see Gustavo Mesch, Online Communities, in HANDBOOK
OF COMMUNITY MOVEMENTS AND LOCAL ORGANIZATION 227, 236 (Ram A. Cnaan &
Carl Milofsky eds., 2007).
172
Gustavo Mesch & Ilan Talmud, The Quality of Online and Offline Relationships The
Role of Multiplexity and Duration of Social Relationships, 22 INFO. SOC’Y 137, 137 (2006).
173
Strahilevitz, supra note 161, at 952–53; Caroline Haythornthwaite, Strong, Weak, and
Latent Ties and the Impact of New Media, 18 INFO. SOC’Y 385, 388 (2002).
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anonymity require meeting unknown people constantly. These
platforms hinder the potential for forming strong ties. In contrast,
facilitating traceable pseudonymity enables an interaction with
consistent personalities, with whom we can transact directly and
carry out two-way conversations.174 This option offers a potential
for forming strong ties. The following discussion will outline an
innovative taxonomy of digital conduct and conversation premised
on the social factors mentioned above. Afterwards, I will apply the
taxonomy to tort law.
D. From General Principles to Specific Application: A Contextual
Taxonomy
Various applications, tools, and social platforms dominate the
new online generation dubbed “Web 2.0.” This new generation
relies on constant contributions and social interactions, and it encourages the flow of information.175 Different strengths of ties have
structured central junctures for information dissemination.176
However, the context of the information and its dissemination vary
depending on the technology used. Distinguishing between different strengths of ties is very important; but applying the sociological
insights to the law is complex. Courts seem to lack the tools to distinguish between platforms based on the strength of ties on a caseby-case basis. They should not wait for a comprehensive sociological study on the ties formed in a specific platform. Drawing on sociological insights, I outline a descriptive innovative taxonomy of
online platforms.
I believe that three different categories of platforms can be
identified according to the strength of ties. The first is freestyle
174
Grimmelman, supra note 1, at 76; Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box:
Considering Transparency, Anonimity and Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the Problems
of Information Privacy in the Internet Society, 58 MIAMI L. REV. 1301, 1340–44 (2004).
175
See CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT
ORGANIZATION 81 (2008); Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0:
Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 303, 330 (2008).
176
Strahilevitz, supra note, 161 at 956 (commenting that information dissemination
through the wider society often depends on weak ties). However, there will be certain
types of information that do not lend themselves to communication via weak ties. See id.
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conversation, which is conducted in an open spontaneous format
(such as message boards) without supervision and guidance. The
platform is a juncture for information dissemination while the ties
among the participants are weak. The second is peer production,
which connects distant heterogeneous participants to a common
goal by sharing and creating information in a decentralized peer
based model. Most social ties in these platforms are weak. However, embedded technical interfaces allow the aggregation, the integration, and the review of the shared information. The third category is deliberation and structuring communities, which are
created by specific users. This category carries out two-way conversations and can transmit complex and personal information. In
this context, strong and intermediary ties may form.
This taxonomy focuses on central conversation types and does
not purport to encompass all platforms or future platforms. Even if
new online platforms evolve, the same methodology could still be
used and assist in formulating proper liability rules. The analysis
would map new conversation contexts adjusting them to the existing taxonomy, which would, in turn, determine the scope of liability.
1. Freestyle Conversation
“Mega scum bag! . . . Cockroach! . . . Someone who knows”177
[routine and representative of many comments in freestyle conversation].
A popular type of online conversations is “freestyle.” It is
spontaneous and immediate without central supervision and guidance. It is broadly accessible, and it is directed at a non-specific audience.178 The platform offers an equal and non-hierarchical environment.179 Often, a large number of speakers participate in a conversation, which is held in real time. In most cases, the conversa177

See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1159 (2008).
See Roy Goldshmidt, Talk-backs in the Israeli Public Discourse, (Knesset Research and
Info. Dep’t, 2006); Yuval Karniel, Defamation on the Internet: A New Approach to Libel in
Cyberspace, 2 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 215, 216 (2009).
179
The absence of constant pseudonyms prevents hierarchy. All participants are equal,
and everyone can equally answer back.
178
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tion is anonymous, and no registration is required to participate.
Thus, most users use monikers rather than their real names or constant pseudonym. Every participant speaks at will, expresses himself in front of the general audience, and usually posts comments
with little thought or preparation. At present, some content providers allow real name comments, by integrating social media plugins.180 However, even in these situations participants comment
freely, without constraints. The magnitude and frequency of comments affects the quality of conversation, and the information diffused is a mixture of facts and opinions.181
Freestyle conversation characterizes “talkbacks”—comments
to an online article, especially in news sites; online message boards;
websites devoted to public comments; and open-wide forums.182
Absence of significant mediation reinforces the spontaneous dimensions and increases the pleasure derived from participating.183
Participants of these conversations are not professional reporters
and are not subjected to ethical norms or disciplinary rules. They
have no defined goals or commitments to other participants and do
not form virtual communities.
a) Strength of Ties in Freestyle Conversation
Freestyle conversation is optimized to support weak ties. The
formation of strong ties should not be assumed within this online
setting. As illustrated below, this conclusion is consistent with the
180

Currently, there are two classes of freestyle comments. See Brian Honigman, 6
Effective Ways to Integrate Social Media with Your E-Commerce Website, SMB & ECOMMERCE TRENDS (Nov. 13, 2013), http://blog.sumall.com/journal/integrate-socialmedia-e-commerce.html [https://perma.cc/AN5B-EQLM]. The first is the traditional
class of comments. This class is characterized by anonymity and absence of hierarchy.
The second class is social based comments. Speakers are connected to their social
networks profiles and participate via real names (ostensibly). In this case, speakers can
delete their comments themselves after the fact. Some content providers define
participants who respond frequently as “leading commentators.” See id.
181
SHIRKY, supra note 175, at 90; Goldshmidt, supra note 178; Grimmelman, supra note
1, at 72.
182
For example, see the comment sections of The Boston Globe and The Delfi.
183
See Yaacov Hecht, The Struggle for Supremacy in the Online Content Market the Case of
Talkbacks, ISRAELI INTERNET ASS’N (Nov. 2003), www.isoc.org.il/magazine/index.html
[https://perma.cc/Y5EL-5QD8] (discussing the special nature of discussions in
talkbacks).
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factors laid by Mesch and Talmud (similarity, duration and multiplexity) for evaluating the strength of social ties. These factors will be
discussed below.
First, with the similarity factor, conversation does not appeal to
specific audience and participants are often random users. Furthermore, it is not characterized by in-depth discussions. The network of participants is very large and heterogeneous.184 In cases
where conversation is held anonymously, it is near impossible to
characterize the participants.
Next, with the duration factor, conversation is spontaneous and
held ad hoc, in the heat of the moment. It is characterized by immediacy and does not last long.185 Furthermore, the number of participants is large.186 It is also hard to evaluate the reputation of the
participants in this setting.187
Lastly, with the multiplexity factor, the conversation revolves
around general topics (for example, comment to an online story).
The content of conversation is impersonal and does not generate
intimacy; the participants are not connected in multiple activities.
These characteristics affect the credibility attributed to the
speech published in the various settings. They are perceived by Internet users as low-level and even weightless.188 Surveys indicate
184

In exceptional cases, when conversation has a specific and focused subject, the
participants might be homogeneous. However, even in these cases, strong ties will not
form due to the absence of the other factors: duration and multiplexity.
185
Thus, participants post their comments, talkbacks, within comment sections right
after the online story is published. The conversation is held ad hoc and, therefore,
ongoing interactions are not expected.
186
See SHIRKY, supra note 175, at 90 (noting that the number of participants implicates
the potential for bi-directional conversation).
187
The platform might define “leading participants” in cases of social-based comment
systems, connected to social network profiles, and enable to track participation. See
Strahilevitz, supra note 160, at 360. However, this definition cannot signal the value and
quality of comments. See id. It only signals that the participant is generally active and
posts comments frequently. See id. In light of these characteristics, intermediary ties are
also not expected to form in this type of conversation. See id.
188
See Karniel, supra note 178, at 216; see also Jacob Rowbottom, To Rant, Vent and
Converse: Protecting Low Level Digital Speech, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 355, 377 (2012) (referring
to the case Clift v. Clarke). In Clift v. Clarke, two users of the defendant’s website posted
comments, which the court found to be flippant, unserious comments. Clift v. Clarke
[2011] EWHC (QB) 1164 [36] (Eng.) (“The postings are in reality, it seems to me, no

898

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:855

that most Internet users do not read comments at all and conceive
them as worthless.189 This perception does not change even when
commentators use their real identities. Despite the negative perception, this form of conversation has value in promoting free
speech. The absence of strong ties among participants emphasizes
the autonomy of the individual speaker and promotes selffulfillment. In addition, freestyle conversation promotes the market
of ideas and participatory democracy.190 As noted above, information flows in freestyle conversations have been discussed in the legal literature191 and in judicial rulings.192 However, the focus was
not on the strength of ties.
2. Peer Production
This was by far the worst experience I have ever encountered with a locksmith. Do not go through this
company . . . . The gentlemen on the phone told me
that a technician would be out ASAP and quoted me
$50 for the service . . . . After the technician finally
showed up, he was trying to charge me $35 for the
service call and $175 for the lock . . . . Call this business at your own risk. –Sara K.193 [one of many diversified reviews on the famous review platform
Yelp].
more than ‘pub talk,’ as it has sometimes been described, and I consider it fanciful to
suggest any reasonable sensible reader would construe them in any other way.”).
Similarly, in the United States, some courts considered this conversation as unreliable
and, therefore, declined to unmask defaming anonymous speakers. See Krinsky v. Doe 6,
159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1175 (“In this case, Doe 6’s messages, viewed in context, cannot
be interpreted as asserting or implying objective facts.”).
189
A survey conducted by the Geocartography Institute found that most Internet users
do not take an interest in online comments. Adar Shalev, New Poll: Most Users Do Not
Read Talkbacks, YNET (July 11, 2007), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L3468737,00.html [https://perma.cc/7BMK-QQ8X].
190
Freestyle conversations fuel rumors, but they also potentially promote the search for
truth. They also facilitate information flows about government. This realm is equally
accessible to everyone and encourages participatory culture. Thus, freestyle leads to the
materialization of the constitutional right of free expression.
191
See Karniel, supra note 178; Rowbottom, supra note 188, at 374, 377.
192
See, e.g., supra note 188.
193
See Kimzey v. Yelp Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1121–22 (2014).
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In this form of communication, thousands of volunteers collaborate in sharing their contributions in a decentralized peer-based
model, rather than on market- or hierarchy-based production. Information is formed and governed by participants, but each contribution is produced independently of the others.194 This model depends on many heterogeneous individuals animated by diverse motivations.195 An important advantage of this type of conversation is
the ability to aggregate, accumulate, and integrate information from
different sources at a low cost.
Technical interfaces embedded within platforms enable the integration of contributions from different sources. These systems,
combined with the participants’ efforts, facilitate reputation mechanisms and enable efficient judgment of quality, trustworthiness,
and relevance. These mechanisms add weight to the text and reduce judgment biases.196 They also allow users to see the overall
market of ideas regarding specific issues.
Ubiquitous computer communication networks cause a dramatic change in the scope, scale, and efficacy of peer production
throughout the information and cultural production systems. Thus,
many online peer-production projects are formed.197 Wikipedia, a
multilingual encyclopedia coauthored by volunteers who create,
edit, and correct entries on familiar topics, is one particularly effec194

YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 59–62 (2006) [hereinafter
BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS]; TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 296;
Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369,
426 (2002) [hereinafter Benkler, Coase’s Penguin].
195
For more on the importance of heterogeneity and diversity, see JEFF HOWE,
CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS
131 (2009); SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES
BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 133–97 (2007); CASS R. SUNSTEIN &
REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO MAKE GROUPS SMARTER 148
(2015).
196
Online feedback mechanisms, such as on eBay, enable a better evaluation of
information. These mechanisms, also known as reputation systems, are building trust
among strangers and fostering cooperation in online marketplaces. See HOWARD
RHEINGOLD, SMART MOBS: THE NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION 113, 126 (2002); Benkler,
Coase’s Penguin, supra note 194, at 390–96; Chrysanthos Dellarocas, The Digitization of
Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms, 49 MGMT. SCI.
1407, 1418 (2003).
197
See BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 194, at 68.
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tive example. Entries about breaking events appear almost instantly, and volunteers can correct any given error in Wikipedia in a
heartbeat. This correction mechanism turns Wikipedia into a robust model of reasonably reliable information.198
Many websites are based on peer-production models for aggregating and sharing information. Slashdot, a news-aggregating website, is a decentralized system for coproducing opinions and sharing
knowledge on technology with hundreds of thousands of active users. The submissions are typically a link to an off-site story,
coupled with commentary from the person who submits the piece.
Slashdot facilitates peer recognition. In the comments section, it
forms accreditation of peer review after the fact. Filtering and accreditation of comments on Slashdot are based on peer ratings of
comments and allow users to filter out low quality comments. Together these mechanisms allow for distributed production of both
relevance and accreditation.199
Peer production is the economic engine of user-based review
sites and rating services, such as Yelp200 and RateMyProfessors.201
These platforms gather reviews, aggregate, and display them. They
are commonly characterized by transparency, thus, participants
can easily view recent activities on the site.202 Crowd-sourced methods are typically in use to rank the reviews. These voting me198

See id. at 71 (pointing out that the journal Nature compared forty-two articles from
Wikipedia to the standard set by Encyclopedia Britannica, and the journal concluded that
the difference in accuracy was not particularly great); JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN: THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 137 (2008); Grimmelman, supra note 1,
at 79.
199
See BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 194, at 76–77, 255; SLASHDOT,
http://slashdot.org [https://perma.cc/2Q6W-FWRU] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
200
Yelp is a popular American website for customers’ recommendations on small
businesses. See YELP, http://www.yelp.com [https://perma.cc/8S33-UJBD] (last visited
May 22, 2016).
201
Rate My Professors is a peer-production platform for professor reviews and ratings
based on student feedback. See RATE MY PROFESSORS, http://www.ratemy
professors.com [https://perma.cc/97HP-4V8C] (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
202
For example, Yelp’s homepage displays the recent reviews contributed to the
platforms and allows other participants to disagree with them. On the importance of
transparency for correcting errors, see BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT: HOW
TECHNOLOGY CAN MAKE GOVERNMENT BETTER, DEMOCRACY STRONGER, AND CITIZENS
MORE POWERFUL 80–82 (2009).
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chanisms enable participants to flag reviews as useful and credible.
Furthermore, some review sites also enable participants to attach a
list of users they rely on. These mechanisms and strategies enable
participants to establish online reputation, improve the quality of
contributions and allow a better evaluation of their credibility. Despite the nuanced differences between the platforms, all of them
aim to achieve a similar goal: peer-production creation and the aggregation of information.
a) The Strength of Ties in Peer-Production Platforms
Peer-production conversation is optimized to support weak ties
at best. The formation of strong ties cannot be assumed within this
online setting. However, among clusters of repeat players, forming
small-world networks within the network,203 intermediary ties
might be formed. In the following Section, I shall discuss this method of communication, evaluating the strength of social ties that
could be formed. Below, I will discuss the factors established by
Mesch and Talmud in this peer-production context.
Regarding the similarity factor, the number of volunteers contributing to this type of conversation is large. It includes different
participants characterized by variety of goals and motivations. In
light of this, I conclude the network is heterogeneous.
With the duration factor, some peer-production platforms do
not allow participation with constant user names. Consequently,
opportunities for continuing interactions are denied and participants are unable to identify one another. Instead, they connect randomly. Other platforms enable registration and participation via
pseudonym or real names; however, most participants are not repeat players.204 Conversations are held ad hoc, not directed at anyone in particular. Thus, it is not characterized by reciprocity or
continuance. However, I would like to note that in some cases, core
participants might contribute to the project regularly and generate
203

BARABÁSI, supra note 157, at 51; KADUSHIN, supra note 158, at 128; WATTS, supra
note 157, at 54.
204
See SHIRKY, supra note 175, at 122. Most of the participants are one-time shooters,
and every one adds a small contribution. However, within this “small world,” there
might be repeat players.
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opportunities for continuing interaction among themselves. These
core participants constitute a “small world” of repeat players active on the platform that is not characterized by long-term interaction.205 This group might influence the overall interaction of the
conversation medium.
Finally, with the multiplexity factor, conversation is focused on
the topic of production rather than on diversified or personal topics. Since most users are not repeat players, there is a low probability for developing a personal dimension in the conversation.
I would like to reiterate in conclusion that strong ties are not
likely to form in this type of conversation. When a platform allows
participation via constant user names and bi-directional conversation, intermediary ties might form among repeat players. However,
in the absence of similarity and due to the focus on specific production project, the formation of strong ties is not likely. Peerproduction conversations are important for promoting free speech.
Absence of strong ties among participants, combined with the platform’s features of aggregating heterogeneous contributions creates a
de facto “market of ideas.” In addition, peer-production conversation promotes autonomy and democracy.206
3. Deliberation and Structuring Communities
Can’t believe what a snake my boss is . . . I know, I
know everyone warned me . . . it’s hard to explain . . . basically, the MRI tech is getting paid for
doing MRI even though he’s not registered and myself, nor the CT tech are getting paid for our

205

Id. at 212–24; KADUSHIN, supra note 158, at 66–67.
In addition to promoting the search of truth and free market of ideas, peerproduction conversation reflects autonomy because every contribution reflects the beliefs
of the individual volunteer who posted it. The promotion of democracy is another
byproduct of peer-production conversation. In this conversation, individuals acquire a lot
of information and are exposed to diverse opinions. This information might assist them in
reaching decisions that are more efficient or criticize the government. This type of
conversation also reflects participatory dimension since every volunteer contributing to
the project shapes this realm and develops democratic culture.

206
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areas . . . . And he needs to keep his creepy hands to
himself . . . . –Sara DeBord207 [a post on Facebook].
Howard Rheingold, one of the pioneering sociologists of online
culture, defined virtual communities as social aggregations that
emerge from the Internet when enough people carry on public discussions long enough, displaying sufficient human feeling to form
webs of personal relationships.208 Conversations whose foci are deliberation and structuring communities fit this definition. This category is not monolithic and incorporates several online communication channels. In general, this type of conversation is characterized by specific audience of repeat players, bi-directional communication, and ongoing interaction among participants. Platforms
supporting this type of conversation normally allow registration via
constant pseudonym or real names, and as a result, hierarchy among
the participants might form. Conversation is characterized by mutual feedback and social approval. It revolves around specific topics
or particular participants. This conversation type structures social
relationships, reciprocal social norms, and trust. The Internet facilitates the formation of diversified social communities. The following are the three main categories of this conversation type: online
forums, weblogs, and microblogs.
First, online forums allow conversations on specific topics and
might be attended by hundreds of participants. Every participant
may open a discussion or join ongoing conversations. In many forums, moderators and community managers assist in organizing
and guiding discussions.209 Different forums appear to include different attributes and traits,210 but all forums promote deliberations
207

DeBord v. Mercy Health Sys. of Kansas, Inc., 737 F.3d 642, 648 (10th Cir. 2013).
The plaintiff in this case wrote a post claiming her boss corrupted and overpaid certain
employees. Id. The claims regarding overpayment were investigated by human resources
and found to be false. Id. at 649. The plaintiff tried to use this post to support a
harassment claim, but failed. Id. at 655.
208
See generally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON
THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (2000).
209
They aspire to organize discussion, form stability, and guard the boundaries of
community. See Karine Barzilai-Nahon, Gatekeepers, Virtual Communities and the Gated:
Multidimensional Tensions in Cyberspace, 11 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 5, 15 (2006).
210
There are different types of forums, such as conversation forums and support
forums. Furthermore, different forums revolve around different topics, affecting the
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and hold a potential of forming strong ties among community participants. Most of these online platforms require participants to
register via constant name–real name or regular pseudonym. This
enables the ongoing discussions of repeat players. The participants
are interested in the same topic and tend to be relatively homogenous. Thus, intimacy within this conversation type is likely.211
Second, blogs (weblogs) consist of posts typically displayed in
reverse-chronological order themed on a variety of topics and sub
topics (personal experiences, news, politics, etc.),212 for different
purposes and audiences.213 Participants can read these posts, then
comment and discuss their content. At first glance, it seems that
the individual author is at the center and the blog focuses on him.
However, a closer look reveals that blogs are normally characterized by regular and occasional commentators and function within
a network of other blogs that link each other.214 Thus, chains of
blogs organize around specific topics and communities of interest.215 This type of conversation platform is characterized by a coninteraction. See, e.g., SUPPORTGROUPS.COM, http://www.supportgroups.com/
[https://perma.cc/3G2N-MBNV] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
211
Studies have shown that a high degree of intimacy exists in support forums and, to a
lesser degree, in conversation forums. See, e.g., Azy Barak & Orit Gluck-Ofri, Degree and
Reciprocity of Self-Disclosure in Online Forums, 10 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 407, 407
(2007). Strong ties may form within online forums, and the interaction might even cross
the virtual boundaries. See, e.g., RHEINGOLD, supra note 208, at xvi–xix (describing his
social experiences at the WELL community).
212
Blogs are very popular worldwide, with more than 77% of Internet users reading
blogs and more than 133 million blogs appearing in the Internet search engine
“Technocrati.” See Power to the People Social Media Tracker Wave 3, UNIVERSAL MCCANN
3, 18 (2008).
213
See generally Michael A. Stefanone & Chyng-Yang Jang, Writing for Friends and
Family: The Interpersonal Nature of Blogs, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 123 (2008)
(describing blogs that are used for social purposes and the preservation of interpersonal
relations). Another example is the political blog that challenges traditional media. See
Thomas J. Johnson, Barbara K. Kaye, Shannon L. Bichard & W. Joann Wong, Every Blog
Has Its Day: Politically-Interested Internet Users’ Perceptions of Blog Credibility, 13 J.
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 100, 102 (2007).
214
For example, the popular blog Daily Kos created a progressive political community.
See DAILY KOS, http://www.dailykos.com/diaries [https://perma.cc/J393-ASPR] (last
visited Mar. 1, 2016).
215
Blogs usually link to similar blogs. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 146–50
(2007).
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stant specific audience of readers and commentators, using their
real names or regular pseudonyms.216
Finally, alongside traditional blogs, microbloging services have
evolved. Twitter is a prominent example of such a service. It is
primarily directed to mobile devices. It allows users to post and
read texts of up to 140 characters, known as “tweets,” and it updates users that choose to follow a particular person. Twitter functions as an online social network. It enables users to attach tweets,
repeat them (“retweet”), share links, and foster social ideas. The
immediacy and accessibility of the service have led to its proliferation.217
Social networks are web-based services that allow individuals to
(1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system; (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection; and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and
those made by others within the system. The nature and nomenclature of these connections may vary from site to site.218
The design and interfaces of the network has significant implications on the types of social interactions.219 Members of social
networks can generate ties of different strengths and are motivated
to join these sites to connect with friends and strengthen ties with
new acquaintances. Thus, many ties are formed because of mutual
interests or shared activities.220 In contrast to online forums and
blogs that revolve around certain topics and communities of interest, social networks are structured on personal—or “egocen216
The blogger is a repeat player and has a constant identity, pseudonym, or real name.
The commentators are usually composed of repeat players. The blog allows a blogger to
form a more direct relationship with friends and new people. See Dario De Notaris, Social
Networks Sites and Life-Sharing, 5 POSTMODERN OPENINGS 103, 110 (2011).
217
See id.
218
Danah Boyd & Nicole Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and
Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 211 (2008); James Grimmelmann,
Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L REV. 1137, 1142 (2009).
219
See IAN BROWN & CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, REGULATING CODE: GOOD
GOVERNANCE AND BETTER REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 118 (2013);
Grimmelman, supra note 218, at 1143.
220
Sebastián Valenzuela, Namsu Park & Kerk F. Kee, Is There Social Capital in a Social
Network Site?: Facebook Use and College Students’ Life Satisfaction, Trust, and Participation,
14 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 875, 876 (2009).
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tric”—networks, with the individual at the center of his or her own
community. This mirrors unmediated social structures more accurately, where the world is composed of networks rather than
groups.221 Persistent usage of these platforms amplifies users’ life
satisfaction, reciprocity, social trust, and civic participation.222 Social networks also allow the promotion of collective initiatives of
civic value.223
As of today, the most prominent social network is Facebook.224
This social network is composed of regular repeat players, who are
rather homogenous. Communication is bi-directional and applies to
a regular, constant audience. Social networks are popular and relevant more than ever:225 new applications, developed for mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets, allow constant extensive
connection to social network platforms in real time, increasing their
appeal and popularity.226
a) The Strength of Ties in Online Realms for Deliberation
and Structuring Communities
Formats that promote deliberations and communities are optimized to facilitate strong ties. In the following Section, I shall demonstrate how the conditional factors for the formation of strong ties
are reflected in this conversation’s characteristics. As conducted in
221

See DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 7–
8 (2014); Boyd & Ellison, supra note 218, at 219.
222
See Valenzuela, supra note 220, at 881.
223
Technical tools embedded within social networks, combined with motivation and
social norms, have brought the promotion of public involvement, cooperation, and civic
engagement. These tools enable the removal of barriers to collective action. For
expansion on this point, see CLAY SHIRKY, COGNITIVE SURPLUS: CREATIVITY AND
GENEROSITY IN A CONNECTED AGE 175 (2010).
224
See Grimmelman, supra note 218, at 1144.
225
Participation in social networks is the most popular activity on the Internet. See
What Americans Do Online: Social Media and Games Dominate Activity, NIELSON (Aug. 2,
2010), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2010/what-americans-do-onlinesocial-media-and-games-dominate-activity.html [https://perma.cc/M65G-2XVR].
226
See RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 158, at 18; De Notaris, supra note 216.
Application for mobile devices enables constant availability. There are also applications
that form social networks aimed only for mobile devices, such as “WhatsApp.” However,
in this case, the intermediary’s roles are different; they function as mere passive conduits,
and their liability is beyond this Article’s scope.
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previous Sections, I will evaluate the similarity, duration, and multiplexity factors in deliberation communities.
With the similarity factor, participants gather around specific
topics, or particular individuals and social groups. They connect
together and share common denominators. Consequently, homogeneity of users is likely to exist in this format.
With the duration factor, conversation is characterized by constant and repeat players. In most forums, registration is a condition
for participation and this allows the identification of repeat players
and facilitates ongoing conversations. As for blogs, the blogger is a
repeat player and in most cases, a network of commentators forms
around his posts, sorting into identifiable communities. Social network platforms allow individuals to construct a personal profile
within the system. In most cases, this profile represents their real
identity.227 Conversations are held by defined specific participants,
apply to a particular audience and are characterized by repeat players. These characteristics enable bi-directional reciprocal communication and opportunities for repeat interaction.
Regarding the multiplexity factor, the conversation’s topics are
varied (personal, social, political, and cultural). Furthermore, conversations might expand to topics over time. In addition, similarity
among participants and ongoing reciprocal conversation increase
the likelihood for kinship and intimate discussions over the platform.
The special characteristics of this conversation platform allow
the definition of collective goals and promote special aspect of free

227

Many social networks, including Facebook, require their users, within the terms of
service, to construct a profile that reflects their real identity (“real name policy”) and use
their “real” offline names when interacting within this realm. Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms [https://perma.cc/NT4L6TTP] (last visited Mar. 1, 2016) (“Facebook users provide their real names and
information . . . . You will not provide any false personal information on
Facebook . . . . The content provider has discretion to disable or delete profiles reflecting
inaccurate personal information.”). For expansion on identity intermediaries, see Zarsky
& Gomes de Andrade, supra note 58.
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speech in advancing democratic culture. As a byproduct, it also increases autonomy and promotes a free market of ideas.228
Table I summarizes the different kinds of conversation platforms in view of the strength of ties formed among their participants.
Table I: Summary of Online Conversation Platforms & Strength of Ties
Social Factors Affecting the Strength of Online Ties

The Conversation Platform

Examples
*Talk-backs
Comment sections in
news sites
The Boston Globe
The Delfi web portal
of Estonia

Freestyle

*Bulletin boards
Yahoo! Message board
*Peer production
projects consist of
many small contributions of volunteers.
Wikipedia
Peer
Production

*Platforms for coproducing opinions
and sharing knowledge
Slashdot

Similarity
(-)
Large and
heterogeneous
crowd of
participants.

(-)
Large and
heterogeneous
group of
volunteer
with diversified
motivation

Duration
(-)
A large crowd of
non-specific participants.
In most cases
anonymous.
It is hard to track
repeat players.
Speech is expressed ad hoc.
(+/-)
Ongoing interaction might exist
only among
The “small
world” of repeat
players.

Multiplexity
(-)
General topics
Not diversified
Not personal

(-)
The topic is
focused on
the peer
production
project
It is not personal and
not diversified.

*User review sites and
rating services.
Yelp
228

This conversation platform promotes extensive opportunities for political expression
and reflects the participatory level of free expression whereas it develops the culture. It
also reflects the individual’s autonomy, as reflected in every speech. This discourse
enhances information flows, brings to the surface new information, and enriches the
market of ideas.

The
Strength
of Ties
Weak
ties at
most

Mostly
week
ties
There
might
form
intermediary ties
at the
“small
world of
repeat
players.
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Social Factors Affecting the Strength of Online Ties

The Conversation Platform

Examples
*Narrow Forums:
Supportgroups+

Deliberation
and
Constructing
Communities

*Blogs
Daily Kos
*Social Networks
Facebook
Twitter

Similarity
(+)
Conversation
Revolves
around
specific
topic or
specific
individuals

Duration
(+)
Pseudonym or
Real names.
Specific audience.
Bi-directional ongoing communication .

Multiplexity
(+)
Diversified
topics that
might be
personal.

III. CONNECTED: TIES, CONTEXTS, AND CONTENT
PROVIDERS’ LIABILITY TOWARDS A NEW MODEL
“Context has always been part of the expression, because expression becomes meaningless if the context becomes arbitrary . . . . Meaning is only ever meaning in context.”229
Speech over the Internet does not take place in a void, but rather in various contexts. Each context facilitates distinctive kinds of
expressions, interactions, and activities among users.230 Differences among conversation platforms (“online social contexts”) influence speech. As I demonstrated above, the strength of ties implies
on the scope of information diffusion and credibility. Based on the
described taxonomy, I wish to propose a model of differential liability regimes. This model would distinguish between conversation
platforms and different group contexts.
Studies proposed that courts should consider the online context when referring to liability for online speech.231 However, they
neither refer to the strength of ties nor do they outline clear distinctions between online contexts.232 Their focus was not on content
229

JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET 136 (2010).
See Durkee, supra note 154, at 777.
231
Jacob Rowbottom, To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level Digital Speech, 71
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 1, 18 (2012).
232
See id.
230

The
Strength
of Ties
Likelihood for
Strong
Ties
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providers’ liability.233 As far as I know, this is the first attempt to
bind a descriptive social technological model, based on social contexts to normative legal structure.
While resting on social online contexts as a central factor for
determining content providers’ liability, we must also outweigh the
nature of liability in every context. Liability is derived from several
central factors related to balancing rights and interests at the base
of speech torts. These factors depend on the social context formed
in different conversation platforms. They are: (1) the gravity of
harm; (2) private ordering (social norms that might mitigate or exacerbate speech-related harms); and (3) the victim’s setting as internal or external to the conversation platform. Analysis reveals
that different conversation platforms and different network settings
embody different levels of harm. The likelihood for a successful
private ordering also varies depending on these contexts. In addition, different aspects of freedom of expression are highlighted in
different online contexts.
Context-specific regulatory regimes may provide courts a simple rule of thumb for defining content providers’ scope of liability.
This regime also grants content providers and entrepreneurs more
certainty, which would facilitate efficient risk management ex ante
and fairness ex post facto. I shall review these factors (gravity of
harm, private ordering, and the victim’s setting) in the following
Sections.
A. Gravity of Harm
Defamation law already takes into account the gravity of harm.
In determining the level of compensation, the law considers the
nature and extent of publication, the degree of credibility recipients
ascribe to it, and the parties’ (both of the speaker and victim) conduct.234 The conversation platform affects the social network’s
context and the incorporation of these factors.
233

Id. at 19; see also CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS, supra note 100, at 1546 (noting that
in the case of the Internet, words may take on a different interpretation because of the
way people treat and react to bulletin boards); Durkee, supra note 154 (focusing on
unmasking anonymous speakers).
234
See COLLINS, supra note 89, at 21.4–.7.
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First, conversation platform affects the nature of information it
transmits. Alongside conversation platforms that facilitate searches
for impersonal stand-alone information, other platforms allow
transmitting complex detailed information. As conversation platforms facilitate flows of complex detailed information, greater
harm might occur. Second, different conversation platforms affect
information flows in varied ways. Conversation platforms’ context
formulates the social structures and the composition of participants
in the social network. It also affects the characteristics of the audience (constant and particular or occasional) and the extent of
publicity. Thus, conversation platforms might affect the likelihood
of reaching the threshold for support and acceptance of speech and
the choice to repeat it in a continuous chain of distribution. The
more individuals evaluate information as credible and accept it, the
greater the gravity of harm it might cause.235 Third, different contexts of conversation platforms affect the speaker’s reputation
within the network and the degree of credence recipients ascribe to
it. As shown, in conversation platforms characterized by occasional
participants, acquiring reputation is not likely. However, there are
platforms characterized by repeat players where speech originates
from a reputable source and is more reliable than anonymous
speech. Thus, conversation platforms, which allow one to acquire
reputation, might cause more extensive harm.
I conclude that different contexts of conversation platforms influence the scope of speech-related harm. The importance of regulating content providers’ liability increases whenever the gravity of
harm is extensive. Understanding social contexts and distinguishing between them allows a better recognition of circumstances

235

Conversation platforms, which allow the formation of strong ties, might lead to
biases and informational and reputational cascades. These influences affect the likelihood
of reaching thresholds for accepting the defamatory speech. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
CONSPIRACY THEORIES & OTHER DANGEROUS IDEAS 15–20 (2014); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 88–92 (2006) [hereinafter
SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ON RUMORS: HOW FALSEHOODS SPREAD,
WHY WE BELIEVE THEM, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE (2009) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN,
RUMORS]; Mark S. Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOC.
1420, 1433 (1978).
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when harm is made. It also outlines a rule of thumb for regulating
content providers’ liability in these situations.
B. Likelihood of Private Ordering
Laws are not the most significant constraints on behavior.
Alongside them, there are other regulating forces.236 As I have
demonstrated above, traditional intermediaries have assumed
codes of conduct on their own. The outlines norms are enforced in
varied degrees of success.237 Private ordering and non-legal strategies are more important online. In this Section, I focus on private
ordering from the bottom up.238 This ordering is formed in a distributed and transparent way among participants by social norms.239
In an online platform, the participants composing a social network commonly outline and enforce the social norms. This model
was found to be effective in many contexts as attested in an important body of scholarship. Many studies have explored settlements
of cooperation and private ordering in communities regulated by
reciprocal social norms.240 They found that coordinated ordering
might emerge through social norms.241 Additionally, private ordering can be tailored specifically to the idiosyncratic needs and transactional challenges of a particular context and can lead to improved

236

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 120–137 (2006); BROWN & MARSDEN,
supra note 219, at 7 (addressing four main factors for regulating a behavior: laws, social
norms, markets, and code); Tal Zarsky, Social Justice, Social Norms and the Governance of
Social Media, 35 PACE L REV. 138, 155 (2015) (referring to four models of government in
social media: code, contract, law, and social norms).
237
See supra Section I.A.
238
On the differences between “top-down” private ordering by code and terms of
services and “bottom-up” private ordering by social norms and on the benefits and
shortcomings of public and private ordering, see Zarsky, supra note 236.
239
See Grimmelman, supra note 1 (referring to types of moderation: exclusion, price,
organization, and norm setting).
240
See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 167 (1991); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 74 (1990); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115,
138 (1992).
241
See supra note 240.
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efficiency.242 Studies explain that actors are more willing to comply
with norms they outline themselves rather than external rules.243
Thus, in many contexts, private informal regulation has been proven to be much more efficient than public ordering.
As I outline a model for regulating content providers’ liability
for speech torts, I wish to strike a proper balance between public
and private ordering. One important guiding insight is that in some
contexts, private ordering is sufficient, while in others, the law is
required. Whenever efficient social norms apply within a conversation platform, formal public regulation is unnecessary.244 In these
cases, formal regulation might even harm efficiency by “crowding
out” intrinsic motivations for regulating interactions by social
norms.245 However, when private regulation fails, formal public
regulation should be required.
The context of a conversation platform and the strength of ties
are closely linked to the internal social structures that may promote
private ordering. Private ordering varies among conversation platforms. In some online contexts, social norms and the “wisdom of
242

Private ordering relies on reputation, which can induce members of a specific
community to comply at a relatively low cost in comparison to public ordering. See Avery
Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1758 (1996); Barak D.
Richman, Essay: Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of
Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2342 (2004).
243
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE PENGUIN AND THE LEVIATHAN: HOW COOPERATION
TRIUMPHS OVER SELF-INTEREST 179 (2011); Elinor Ostrom, James Walker & Roy
Gardner, Covenants with and Without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible, 86 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 404, 413–14 (1992); Richard R. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory
and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being, 55 AM.
PSYCHOL. 68, 69 (2000). Individuals tend to have an innate need for autonomy. They
need to feel that they are in control of their own preferences. So, when they feel
controlled by external rewards and punishment, their sense of autonomy may be
threatened, and they tend to rebel by refusing to obey. In contrast, private ordering can
preserve autonomy and bring more efficient obedience and enforcement at a low cost.
244
See Ryan & Deci, supra note 243, at 71–73.
245
The phenomenon of “crowding out” exists in particular when extrinsic incentives
are enforced by sanctions, such as fines or punishments. However, this phenomenon also
applies when the extrinsic motivation is positive, like in the case of rewards. See BENKLER,
supra note 243, at 169, 173–74; SHIRKY, supra note 223, at 131–35; Edward L. Deci,
Intrinsic Motivation, Extrinsic Reinforcement and Inequity, 22 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 113, 118–19 (1972); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J.L.
STUD. 1, 15 (2000).
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the crowd” allow efficient private ordering.246 However, in other
platforms, social context might bring to informational and reputational cascades, exacerbate speech harms, and undermine efficient
private ordering.247
I shall explain the connection between the conversation platform and the likelihood of private ordering in detail below, focusing
on two central dimensions. First, social context influences the potential to counter speech by victims and allow them to clear their
names.248 Second, social context affects the participants’ composition and the social dynamics. I will demonstrate that some dynamics can mitigate speech related harms when participants oppose the
defaming speech and correct it. In contrast, other social dynamics
may validate the defaming speech and exacerbate speech related
harms.
C. Internal and External Victims
In addition to the gravity of harm and likelihood of private ordering, I shall distinguish between two kinds of victims: the internal
victim, a community member who chose to take part in a conversation and was defamed while interacting with other participants; and
the external victim, an individual outside the social network, who
was defamed in a conversation he did not take part in.249
246

See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER
THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMICS,
SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS 22 (2005).
247
Informational cascades are formed when individuals follow the statements or actions
of predecessors and do not express their opposing opinions because they believe their
predecessors are right. As a result, the social network does not obtain important
information. Reputational cascades are formed because of social pressures. In these cases,
people think they know what is right, or what is likely to be right, but they nonetheless go
along with the crowd in order to maintain their status. See Cass R. Sunstein & Reid
Hastie, Four Failures of Deliberating Groups (Univ. of Chi. Law School, Working Paper
No. 215, 2008).
248
The idea of counter speech was established in the case of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270. See also RICHARDS, supra note 82, at 37–39; Robert D.
Richards & Clay Calvert, Counterspeech 2000: A New Look at the Old Remedy for “Bad”
Speech, B.Y.U. L. REV. 553, 553–55 (2000).
249
For similar distinctions between inner and outer environments, see Tal Zarsky, Law
and Online Social Networks: Mapping the Challenges and Promises of User-Generated
Information Flows, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 741, 774 (2008).
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The victim’s social setting, whether it is external or internal, affects the gravity of harm. Therefore, the setting should be taken
into account when a model for content providers’ liability is formulated. The severity of harm of an internal victim is lower than the
external. An internal user might enjoy the protection of private ordering, unlike the external user, since he is an outsider to the social
dynamic of the group. As a result, in this case, public regulation
might be required.
An internal victim has participated in the conversation. Therefore, he can counter the defamatory speech immediately after its
publication, thus restoring his image. He is aware of the social
norms of conversation, so he can conduct an efficient self-risk
management assessment regarding whether he wants to take part in
a particular conversation. He can also decide to quit the conversation platform. Or, he can attempt to change and improve his social
standing within the community.250 In contrast, an external victim
would probably find out about the defamatory utterance long after
publication. As a result, he would not have a fair opportunity to respond.251 In many conversation platforms, participants do not have
to use their real names.252 Therefore, internal actors can control
their exposure to risk by using pseudonyms.253 External victim,
however, cannot control the level of exposure to potential damage
to his reputation, which might extend beyond the specific conversation realm.
The likelihood for private ordering is also linked to the victim’s
setting; interpersonal and group dynamics might enhance regulation. Members of the community might publish rules regarding be250

See ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES 15 (1972). In organizations and communities,
members respond by exiting when the organization demonstrates a decrease in quality
(withdrawing from the relationship), or, alternatively, they improve the relationship
through communicating a complaint.
251
Delayed counter speech might not mitigate harm and can fail to restore the victim’s
reputation efficiently.
252
Online social networks are usually an exception to this rule. See supra note 227.
253
Whenever internal actors use pseudonyms, the extent of harm is limited to the group
context. Thus, even if the defamatory speech can be republished and diffused outside the
specific group, it cannot be linked to his real name and identity offline.
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havior, develop social norms, and enforce them to the benefit of
internal users. Other participants might sanction participants who
harm the community and infringe communal culture and norms.254
Thus, group contexts lead to self-governance and have a restraining
effect. In contrast, the external victim does not belong to the community and the restraining social norms described above do not apply to him. In some contexts, social interactions within a community might have an adverse effect and even exacerbate his harm.255
This analysis leads to the following conclusion: whenever the
severity of harm is low and there is a substantial likelihood for private ordering, formal regulations are unnecessary. Whenever discussions in a platform lead to severe harm alongside substantial likelihood for private ordering, it must be examined whether the
harm can be mitigated in this fashion. One should take into account
whether the victim was internal or external to the setting. In online
contexts, which lead to successful private ordering, formal regulation is redundant.
D. Severity of Harm and Private Ordering in Light of Different
Conversation Platforms
1. Freestyle Conversation
Freestyle conversation platform is characterized by weak ties;
thus, the potential of harm is low. The information diffused in this
realm is composed of small, stand-alone items, and it does not facilitate the diffusion of in-depth personal information. In contrast to
peer-production platforms, this platform does not integrate infor254

These participants might experience gatekeeping. See Karine Barzilai-Nahon,
Gatekeeping in Virtual Communities: On Politics of Power in Cyberspace, 6 HICSS-39 135
(2006).
255
Group identity motivates participants to identify and sacrifice their interests in favor
of the group. However, there is a flip side; solidarity usually results in a mentality of “us”
against “them.” Group members treat themselves differently than they treat outsiders.
Solidarity among group members might lead to indifference towards others, xenophobia,
and intolerance of strangers. Thus, a coherent group might unite against the external
individual. See BENKLER, supra note 243, at 89–95; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO
EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE 103–07 (2009); Samuel Bowels &
Herbert Gintis, Persistent Parochialism: Trust and Exclusion in Ethnic Networks, 55 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 2 (2004).
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mation from different sources. The audience is non-specific; speech
is not directed at defined recipients; and the platform forms a juncture for information diffusion. If a conversation is held anonymously, it might be impossible to identify participants. Heterogeneity of
participants is also very likely. Even when participants use their real
identity (when the content provider integrates social media plugins
in the platform),256 conversation is still conducted ad hoc, and the
audience is non-specific. Thus, it is unlikely that the participants will
create a reputation for themselves.257
Information is disseminated to a large audience; however, participants are independent with no discernable hierarchy. Thus, it is
unlikely that participants would organize an attack on a single victim. Since numerous comments are expressed in a short period of
time, a specific comment is generally followed by many others. As a
result, a specific defamatory comment is less public, and it is improbable that significant number of readers will access it.258 The
seriousness of a specific defamatory expression in this context is
weak.259 Moreover, in the absence of ongoing discussions and in
light of the spontaneity and immediacy of speech, in-depth conversations are not held. Therefore, statements made within this conversation are not considered credible, they do not leave any real impression, and Internet users consider them insignificant.260

256

In Section II.D.1, I discussed social plugins that enable participants to express
freestyle comments using their social network profile. See supra note 180 and
accompanying text.
257
Commentators via social plugin build certain reputations when they interact in a
social network platform. However, this reputation does not follow them to the freestyle
conversation platform. Celebrities might be an exception because their general reputation
follows them everywhere.
258
See Tamiz v. Google, Inc. [2013] EWCA (Civ) 68 [50] (Eng.).
259
Rowbottom, supra note 188, at 373 (noting that the focus should be directed at the
audience of the platform, and also on the attention the comment will gain because
multiplicity of comments obscures the attention to a specific defamatory comment and
diminishes the gravity of harm).
260
See Karniel, supra note 178, at 233 (stating that talkbacks and chat rooms on the
Internet do not leave any real impression); Shalev, supra note 189; see also Magyar
Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, App. No. 22947/13, Eur.
Ct. H.R. 135 (2016): “For the Court, the expressions used in the comments, albeit
belonging to a low register of style, are common in communication on many Internet
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The possibility of causing harm in freestyle online conversation
is marginal even to an external victim, whose identity is known, due
to the superficial format, and low credibility ascribed to it. In addition, multiplicity of comments obscures the prominence of a specific defamatory comment.
The same goes to the internal victim, who takes part in the conversation (usually anonymously) and is offended by speech directed at him (for example, “to commentator 59”). The victim
controls his online persona and can respond anonymously. The
speech is not linked to his identity offline, and harm is usually limited to momentary discomfort. Even when participants use social
plugins, commenting via social network profiles that reveal their
real identity, they control their statements and can delete them after the fact to reduce harm.261
Private ordering can repair the minor harm mentioned above. In
these conversation formats, the victim can respond and mitigate
the damage. The internal victim can respond immediately, correct
the impressions formed by the defamatory statement, and clear his
name.262 In the absence of strong ties, this conversation format is
characterized by a wide range of heterogeneous ideas which might
serve as a counterweight for the defamatory speech by correcting
it. Thus, readers would be exposed to diverse opinions. The external victim can also counter the defamatory statement if he learns
about it soon after publication.
The attributes of this conversation format diminish concerns to
severe violation of autonomy; defamatory statements should not
lead to suppression of speech. Although speech in this format does
not leave behind it significant impression, it has positive aspects in
promoting the autonomy of the speakers and self-fulfillment. The
minor harms and the likelihood for private ordering regarding both
portals – a consideration that reduces the impact that can be attributed to those
expressions.” Id. at para. 77.
261
In such cases, after the victim deleted his speech, although the defaming speech
remains in conversation, it is detached from the full context and is considered
meaningless.
262
For the efficiency of the counter-speech doctrine, explaining that “bad speech” can
be effectively countered or cured with more speech, see Richards & Calvert, supra note
248.
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internal and external victims lead to the conclusion that the law
should exempt content providers from liability for users’ defamatory statements in this conversation format.
Exempting content providers from liability fits well with the
normative considerations for liability and reflects a proper balance.263 Alternative liability standards that were discussed above264
do not lead to optimal balance among normative considerations.
They would lead content providers to remove socially beneficial
speech from their platform even though the harm is minor at most.
The outcome would cause a chilling effect, injustice, and inefficiency.265 In view of this, exempting content providers reflects the
optimal balance in this conversation platform.
2. Peer Production
In this conversation platform, the majority of participants are
not repeat players, and weak ties connect them. However, at the
core of this platform, “small worlds” might form, and in this particular clustering, intermediary ties might exist.266 This conversation platform embodies extensive severity of harm. The unique
platform facilitates aggregation and integration of information from
different sources and enables the dissemination of complex in-depth
information.
The audience is extensive, even though the speech is not referred to specific recipients; however, discussions among the core
263

First, in light of the minor harm of this conversation platform, an exemption for
content providers reflects the proper balance between the speaker’s right to free speech
and the victim’s rights for speech and dignity, while enhancing autonomy and selffulfillment. Second, an exemption for content providers of this conversation platform is
justified by corrective justice because content providers do not cause speech-related
harms themselves. In addition, the operation of platforms is just a background risk. Third,
economic considerations also justify exempting content providers’ liability in this
conversation platform in light of the minor harm and the high prevention costs that
exceed their benefits; deterrence through liability is inefficient. Innovation considerations
justify exemption from liability and avoid hampering technological developments.
264
See supra Section I.E (discussing alternative liability regimes: notice-and-takedown,
negligence, and strict liability).
265
See supra Section I.E (noting that other liability regimes cause over-deterrence and
result in the removal of non-defamatory beneficial content).
266
For an explanation of the small world phenomenon, see supra Section I.D.2.
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participants are bi-directional and refer to specific members. In this
platform, discussions are not ad hoc but are held in unique environments for peer-production projects. Despite the absence of
strong ties among participants, statements made in these conversation platforms are considered credible.267 This outcome is partly
due to the technical interfaces. The architecture enables writing
entries or submitting reviews on specific topics, the integration of
contributions, and online feedback mechanisms affect the weight
ascribed to statements in this conversation platform. This might
lead to extensive harm for external and internal victims.
Although most participants aspire to contribute in peerproduction projects and add credible information, some of them
prefer their self-interest to the project’s success and publish false
defamatory statements. As to an external victim, the aggregation of
information from many sources to a consolidated output that specifically refers to an identified victim can cause extensive harm. As
studies emphasize, rating and review websites can have a big impact on the success—or failure—of a business.268 Thus, negative
reviews about a specific business on a rating and review website are
likely to bring customers to avoid its services, and this results in
loss of economic opportunities. However, participants of this conversation platform are heterogeneous, each user acts independently
from the other,269 thus creating a diverse “market of ideas.”270 As
267

Statements expressed in peer-production conversation are perceived credible. For
instance, the journal Nature reviewed Wikipedia and found it was as accurate as the
encyclopedia Britannica. See supra note 198. Review websites and rating services were
also found credible. For example, Professor Lior Strahilevitz introduced findings, which
showed that quality control often elicits helpful and reasonably accurate feedback.
Professors’ feedbacks correlate with scores on in-class student evaluations of teaching
performance. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous Litigation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
1239, 1247–50 (2010).
268
See ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE 118
(2014); Michael Luca, Reviews, Reputation, and Revenue: The Case of Yelp.com (Harv. Bus.
Sch., Working Paper No. 12-016, 2011). The number of stars a restaurant has on its Yelp
profile closely correlates to the amount of business it receives. Consumers’ reviews thus
present a new way of disseminating information over the Internet, and they are becoming
a substitute for traditional forms of reputation building.
269
Heterogeneity and the independence of speakers are kept in spite of the potential for
intermediary ties among the core repeat players. In contrast to conversation platforms
that facilitate strong ties, the peer-production platform is not characterized by
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a result, the likelihood that the participants unite against one victim
decreases.
Offensive defamatory statements might harm an internal victim
in peer production projects. In some cases, participants even attack
others personally and violate the platform’s policy and terms of
service.271 However, most participants usually use pseudonyms and
separate themselves from their real identity. Thus, the gravity of
harm is limited to the internal setting.272 Discussions on the peerproduction project are neither personal nor multiplex. Furthermore, in light of the participants’ heterogeneity, the likelihood that
many participants unite against one victim decreases in this setting.
Nevertheless, internal victims might bear emotional harm, and
their reputation might be damaged within the community, although
the gravity of harm is lower than the external victim’s harms.
In this conversation platform, social forces facilitate private ordering. These forces mitigate harm and support the exemption of
content providers from liability. In the absence of strong ties, peerproduction conversation platforms contain a variety of ideas. In
addition, technical interfaces within platforms (feedback and rating
mechanisms), promote private ordering via “wisdom of the

homogeneity or personal discussions. It focuses on the peer-production project and the
topic at hand. It is not characterized by multiplexity. Therefore, strong ties will not form
even among the core repeat players. Intermediary ties are different from strong ones and
will not exacerbate the gravity of harm. See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 160.
270
See, e.g., Reit v. Yelp!, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 412–13 (Sup. Ct. 2010). In this case, a
dentist’s business Yelp page included favorable reviews alongside negative reviews. Id.
271
In many peer-production platforms, content providers restrict their participants’
behavior. See Terms of Service, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/static?p=tos&country=US
[https://perma.cc/XDM6-G5KL] (last visited Mar. 2, 2016) (“You agree not to, and will
not assist, encourage, or enable others to use the Site to . . . . Threaten, stalk, harm, or
harass others, or promote bigotry or discrimination.”); Policies and Guidelines, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Policies_and_guidelines [https://perma.cc/5R
AC-KG2Z] (last visited Mar. 2, 2016).
272
To the extent that participants link their online identity with their real one (for
instance, in cases when participants connect themselves to their real identity by
registering to the peer-production platform via their real names), they choose to expose
themselves to defamation risks. Furthermore, the risk of harm in this conversation realm
is limited in view of heterogeneity and the focus on the peer-production project. The
absence of strong ties implicates the gravity of harm.

922

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:855

crowd,”273 and allow efficient judgment of quality, trustworthiness,
and relevance of content. In addition, the absence of strong ties reduces the likelihood of social pressures among participants. Thus,
independence and diversity are maintained.
Private ordering mitigates the internal victim’s harms. Heterogeneity and independence of participants enable equal opportunity
for a victim to counter defamatory speech. Furthermore, the participant’s commitment to the project incentivizes them to take part
in private ordering and correct mistakes. Intermediary ties among
members of the core of repeat players might facilitate a reciprocity
dynamic, social monitoring, and enforcement. These dynamics enhance the potential of private ordering.274
Private ordering is also sufficient for protecting the interests of
external victims. Although this type of victim cannot respond with
counter speech in real time, social forces within this conversation
platform mitigate the harm. More than a decade ago, a famous
software engineer proposed: “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are
shallow.”275 Analogically, in the absence of strong ties and in view
of the platform’s attributes, participants would correct errors in
order to improve the peer-production project and outputs. They
might even bring to the removal of defamatory statements on platforms.276 I shall illustrate below how some technological and sociological mechanisms improve social ordering of external and internal
victims. To do so, I will refer to popular content providers of this
conversation platform: Wikipedia and Yelp.
Wikipedia created its own policies, enforcement schemes, and
norms,277 and well-functioning core members enforce social

273

See SUROWIECKI, supra note 246 (referring to four characteristics that make a group
smart: diversity, independence, decentralization, and coordination).
274
See Elinor Ostrom, Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust, Reciprocity and
Reputation, in TRUST & RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FOR EXPERIMENTAL
RESEARCH 19, 41 (Elinor Ostrom & James Walker eds., 2005).
275
ERIC S. RAIMOND, THE CATHEDRAL & THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN
SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 19 (2001).
276
In some platforms, participants might bring the removal of harmful content by
flagging it as offensive. See supra note 153.
277
See Zittrain, supra note 198, at 144.
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norms.278 Private ordering mechanisms diminish the likelihood of
severe harm for the internal victim. Participants can represent their
controversial views on discussion pages. They can report impolite,
uncivil, or other difficult communications on special notice
boards.279 Moreover, Wikipedia has an official dispute-resolution
system starting with talking to one another and commenting, following by mediation and ending with an arbitration committee.280
This committee can sanction participants who do not operate according to the norms and guidelines and may even ban members of
the community who make life unpleasant for their fellow users and
behave in an anti-social manner.281 Technology facilitates enforcement and enables a ban of participants from editing certain articles
or totally blocking their IP addresses. Enforcement mechanisms
also diminish the likelihood of defamation or misinformation for
external victims. Reciprocal monitoring within the vast community
enables the publication of neutral undistorted entries that improve
the project. In general, private ordering mechanisms on Wikipedia
are efficient.282
278

Wiki tools do not govern themselves according to official private ordering process,
but the social norms of the core repeat player and the peers’ obligation to the project keep
users in line. A Wikitorial experiment conducted by the Los Angeles Times failed even
though it used similar Wiki tools. In this experiment, the conversation was “freestyle.”
See Grimmelman, supra note 1, at 87.
279
David A. Hoffman & Salil K. Mehra, Wikitruth: Through Wikiorder, 59 EMORY L.J.
151, 173 (2010) (detailing the guiding principles of Wikipedia).
280
This system performs two different functions simultaneously. First, it removes those
who would destroy Wikipedia through their failure to abide by its norms. Second, it
provides guidance to those who value Wikipedia as a community, but disagree as to
proper conduct, so that they can coordinate their behavior within a common framework
of norms and rules. See id. at 175.
281
See id. at 194. Wikipedia is a divide between substance and process. It ascribes great
severity for anti-social behavior more than violations of editing policies. The severe
sanctions are reserved for anti-social behavior. As for the content, Wikipedia commonly
trusts participants to correct mistakes. Thus, the sanctions for policy violations are
usually less radical. Id.
282
In cases where defamatory speech remains uncorrected, it is probably due to the fact
that few people take notice of it. Thus, in these cases, harm is insignificant. For instance,
a prankster had made an edit to the Wikipedia article about journalist John Seigenthaler,
suggesting that he had been involved in the assassinations of John F. Kennedy. The
statement is false but did not appear as vandalism. The article sat unchanged for four
months until a friend alerted Seigenthaler to it. The defamatory expression would have
been corrected if more people took notice of it. See Zittrain, supra note 198, at 138.
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In rating websites and review services, the environment is less
charged than it is on Wikipedia.283 Every participant can contest a
review by writing a new review, describing a different experience.
He can also use the option to “talk” and open a conversation about
a particular review.284 The heterogeneity and independence of participants allow the successful use of counter speech. Moreover,
participants can report offensive comments and the content provider may remove them.
In review websites, the rights of an external victim are protected by private ordering, and wisdom of the crowd mitigates
harm. Diversified reviews are aggregated in one platform and allow
a balanced market of ideas. Moreover, heterogeneity of participants
enables efficient feedback by voting and reputation mechanisms.285
These private ordering schemes enable the website’s users to estimate a review’s credibility. The option to start “talks” also plays
an important role in the external context. Participants can refer to
particular reviews, express their opinion regarding their fairness
and counter speech.
I conclude that in this conversation platform, social forces and
the platform’s ability to aggregate diverse expressions facilitate a
balanced conversation. They also promote efficient private ordering for both internal and external victims. In most cases, private
ordering is an efficient method that can mitigate speech tort’s
harms. The law, therefore, should exempt content providers from
liability to speech related harms for both types of victims in this
conversation platform. An exemption from liability would promote
an efficient market of ideas and bring to optimal exercise of the
right to freedom of speech in this conversation platform. This conclusion remains true even when there are only few participants.
283

In contrast to Wikipedia mechanisms, review website and rating services do not
enable participants to edit other participants’ reviews. Thus, the likelihood for extensive
disputes is relatively low. Additionally, in light of this platform’s architecture, reviews
cannot be vandalized, as opposed to vandalism of entries in Wikipedia.
284
See Talk, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/talk [https://perma.cc/DY2X-JN2K] (last
visited May 22, 2016).
285
The platform notes the number of reviews every participant wrote and the
participants who trusts him. In addition, voting mechanisms facilitate efficient feedback
by participants.

2016]

CONTENT PROVIDERS’ SECONDARY LIABILITY

925

One might argue that in an environment with few users, private
ordering might not be sufficient. However, few opinions do not reduce the efficacy of private ordering.286 Liability rules that exempt
content providers are superior to other liability regimes. In this
conversation platform, other liability regimes, such as notice-andtakedown, negligence, and strict liability, are far from ideal and negatively affect the quality of information products, undermining the
purpose of these types of platforms. Hence, in this online context,
exempting content providers from liability is the best alternative to
other liability regimes.287 This conclusion is in line with the discussed normative considerations.288
3. Deliberation and Structuring Communities
In this conversation platform, the gravity of harm is extensive
in light of the strong ties formed between participants. This conversation platform facilitates in-depth discussions and enables the
dissemination of complex information. The participants are repeat
players who deliberate among themselves. The audience characterized by homogeneity and their opinions are likely to be uniform.289
286

The fact that only few people participate does not undermine heterogeneity of
participants and balanced responses. Additionally, when there are only few participants,
the reliance on the information published material also decreases and the gravity of harm
is relatively low. For instance, one uncorrected review affects less than many uncorrected
reviews. Moreover, the fact that there are only few reviews might indicate that only few
people use the website. Thus, the defamatory speech has less exposure.
287
Imposing liability on content providers would cause the removal of expressions from
the platforms even if they are not defamatory. Content providers cannot determine
whether expressions are true or false and whether they fall under defamation laws. Since
they would like to limit their exposure to liability, content providers would take
precautionary actions and remove expressions. This results in over-deterrence.
288
See supra Section I.D. Exemption of content providers from liability makes an ideal
balance between free speech and dignity in this conversation realm. Exemption would
reduce a possible chilling effect; the likelihood for private ordering mitigates harm to an
individual’s dignity and reputation. Hence, the exemption of liability balances
constitutional considerations properly. Exemption of liability fits well with conservative
theories of tort law. Content providers do not cause the defamatory expression. In light of
private ordering, cost-benefit analysis also justifies exemption. This outcome will also
promote innovation and development of advanced peer-production platforms without
being concerned of liability. Id.
289
See SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 235, at 9 (describing homogenous
communities as “echo chambers” and self-reinforcing “information cocoons”). This
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Consequently, continuing mass attacks directed at specific individuals is probable. The strength of ties and hierarchy among community members increases social pressure, and group dynamics might
lead to extremism.290 These dynamics intensify the scope of defamatory speech and amplify the gravity of harm.291 In addition,
statements made in this conversation platform are considered credible. Strong ties among participants and continuing conversations
among repeat players that gain personal reputation increase an expression’s credibility relatively to anonymous interactions.292
These characteristics lead to severe harm for specific individuals.
The potential harm to an internal victim because of violations
of proper conversation norms is extensive. Even if we ignore the
potential of mass attacks against a specific individual, the internal
victim’s emotional harm is more extensive than in other conversation platforms. The reasons are the strength of ties and the audience of the defamatory statements.293 In this conversation platform, most participants are repeat players. Defamation harm might
be continuous, ruin the internal victim’s reputation, and undermine his status within the community. However, in light of his ability to control his online reflection and identity, he can represent
himself by a pseudonym before joining the platform. Thus, he can
limit his harm only to the internal context. The ability to refrain
from using one’s real identity is an important policy consideration
for not imposing liability on content providers when the victim
reciprocal reinforcement among community members facilitates powerful attacks, and the
group’s identity reduces self-awareness and self-control. See Tom Postmes & Russel
Spears, Deindividuation and Antinormative Behavior: A Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL.
238, 254 (1998). Evidence of uniformity and homogeneity in this conversation realm were
also found lately. For instance, mapping conversations in online social networks led to the
conclusion that social networks lead to self-enforcement and polarization. See Gilad
Lotan, Israel, Gaza, War & Data, MEDIUM (Aug. 4, 2014), https://medium.com/idata/israel-gaza-war-data-a54969aeb23e [https://perma.cc/M2SB-7WXR].
290
See SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 235, at 88–92; SUNSTEIN, RUMORS, supra note
235, at 21–27.
291
See Grimmelman, supra note 218, at 1177.
292
See Strahilevitz, supra note 161, at 964.
293
In conversation platforms that promote deliberation and communities, the audience
of a defaming speech directed at an internal victim is composed of participants of his own
virtual community. Because of the social ties between the victim and his surroundings,
the gravity of harm is more extensive.
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chose to reveal his real identity. In other words, one may argue that
the victim has consented to the risk of harm, and there is a voluntary assumption of risk.294
An exception to this rule is social networks, where the practice
is that participants reflect their real identity. Some social networks,
such as Facebook, require registration and identifying in real
names.295 One may argue that in these cases an alternative balance
is required. However, a closer look shows this is not the case.
When the rule is that participants reveal their real identity―the
victim would be able to file a suit against the speaker who is directly
responsible to harm and the justifications to content providers’ liability weakens. The victim can be compensated, and the speaker
could remove the defamatory speech, whereas in social networks,
the participants themselves can delete their statements after the
fact.296 Additionally, the victim can report to the content provider
about the violation of terms of service whenever an individual do
not reveal his real identity. In response, the content provider might
remove the speaker’s profile.297
294

See James Fleming, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 196
(1968). This defense is limited in scope and will not apply to a bilateral level, in a suit
between the victim and the speaker. Nevertheless, I think this principle should be applied
in the context of third-party liability.
At this point, one can argue that considering the victim’s ability to control his online
persona as part of a model for legal liability conveys a normative message that it is
inappropriate for individuals to reveal themselves and reflect their real identity online.
The result of depriving remedies from these victims may encourage anonymity online.
However, despite this outcome, I think that the principle of voluntary assumption of risk
is appropriate. Anonymity has many positive implications. It enables participants to
mitigate their risks and protect themselves in many contexts. Additionally, it facilitates
self-disclosure. Concealing one’s real identity does not necessarily harm civilized dialogs.
In these cases participants are repeat players and the reputation of their pseudonym is
important to them. Hence, it is likely that they fit in to acceptable social norms.
295
This practice is called “real names policy.” See supra note 227.
296
In this context, I reviewed the legal regime in England, where the liability of content
providers is residual. See supra Section I.C.2.a. I do not believe that a residual liability
regime is ideal in every online context particularly because the content provider can
remove the defamatory content, whereas the main remedy from the speaker is
compensation. However, in the context of social networks this regime might be
appropriate especially in light of the speaker’s technical ability to delete his statements
after the fact.
297
See Zarsky, supra note 58, at 1337 (referring to the possibility of removing or blocking
profiles that do not reflect a real identity). See, e.g., This Woman Changed Her Name Just
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The damage to the external victim is more extensive than the
internal one. Strong ties among participants and their homogeneity
affects the social dynamic of the group. It leads to solidarity within
the group; yet, there is a flip side. It may lead to indifference towards outsiders, xenophobia, and intolerance.298 As a result, it is
more likely that participants will unite against external victims.299
Thus, falsehoods may become conventional wisdom and cause severe harm. Unfortunately, this has occurred more than a few
times.300
Nevertheless, it would be an oversight to conclude the discussion at this point. In this conversation platform, the likelihood for
strong ties among participants is high. Strong ties form homogenous social structures that produce cohesion among participants. In
this conversation platform, private ordering is extremely important. Private ordering can mitigate the damage and should affect
the preferred liability policy. However, in this online platform,
there is a gap in the manner external and internal victims are
treated. As will be shown in the following Sections, the efficacy of
clearing one’s name depends on the social status of the user.
Users in internal settings appreciate the strong ties with other
participants; they form homogenous social structures, which support continuing relationships and closeness. These structures promote empathy, solidarity, and considerable willingness to cooperate.301 Strong ties between participants lead to social norms of reciprocity and trust. These norms preserve social control; and as a
So She Could Log in to Facebook, TIME (July 13, 2015), http://time.com/3955056/
facebook-social-media-jemma-rogers-uk/ [https://perma.cc/QUQ3-84C4].
298
For an explanation of the implications of a group’s identity, see supra note 255.
299
See, e.g., Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 37 (Dec. 14, 2012). A
woman posted a status on her Facebook page criticizing a colleague’s comment regarding
her treatment of clients. Id. at *1. She called her fellow co-workers to comment, and four
employees responded by posting messages objecting to the idea that their work
performance was deficient and attacked the colleague that made the statement. Id.
300
See Boston v. Atheran, 329 Ga. App. 890, 890 (2014). On external victim’s speech
related harm, see CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 2. Defamatory posts
usually spread among like-minded participants. They can also cause defamatory
comments, which support the original post, and exacerbate the external victim’s harm.
301
See BENKLER, supra note 243, at 89–92. The homogeneity and solidarity sustain
cooperation.
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result, they are normally more efficient than public formal ordering.302 In most cases, community members conform to the shared
values and social norms. They follow their own internal code, and
they strive to achieve common goals.303 In addition, they also fear
social sanctions.304 The internal victim is an integral part of the
community. Being aware of the social norms of the conversation,
he should decide accordingly whether he wants to take part in the
conversation, in his attempt to clear his name. Or, he may opt to
withdraw from the conversation and limit his damage.305
The external victim, in contrast, is disadvantaged by the social
context, which increases the chances for unsuccessful private ordering. The participants may not remedy the damage, but might
exacerbate it. Strong ties create group identity and an isolated
community suspicious of outsiders. This context leads to polarization and enhances social pressures.306 It increases the likelihood
that participants unite against the external victim.307 The likelihood
for balancing comments to counter the defamatory speech is low.
Consequently, the impression of the defamatory comments shall
remain unilaterally negative. The likelihood for an external victim
to clear his name by countering the defaming speech is negligible,
since the victim is not part of the conversation. Even if the defamatory comment becomes immediately known to the victim, the social dynamic of the group limits his ability to counter the speech

302

A large body of scholarship describes efficient private ordering and successful
mechanisms for dispute resolution optimally adjusted to the needs of the group. The
strength of ties actually isolates the group from other communities and allows an efficient
self-government. Social norms allow private ordering and wealth maximization. See
Ostrom, Walker & Gardner, supra note 243.
303
See BENKLER, supra note 243, at 20.
304
The members of the community function as gatekeepers. They cope with internal
offenders who infringe communal culture successfully. See Barzilai-Nahon, supra note
254, at 6.
305
See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 250; SUNSTEIN, supra note 255, at 44.
306
Studies suggest that group polarization is more likely and is heightened when people
have a sense of shared identity and belong to a tight-knit group or a club. Shared identities
can be a breeding ground for both confidence and extremism. See SUNSTEIN & HASTIE,
supra note 195, at 85–86.
307
See BENKLER, supra note 243, at 92–95; SUNSTEIN, supra note 255, at 107.
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efficiently.308 As a result, private ordering in this setting is inadequate.309
I have reached the conclusion that participants’ social norms
and internal social sanctions mitigate the risks for uncontrolled
harm to the internal victim. Thus, the potential for private ordering
reduces speech-related damage. Additionally, the internal victim
can control his online identity by using pseudonyms that would reduce the potential for harm. Alternative liability regimes might
cause over-deterrence and result in a chilling effect. Top-down intervention might affect the social structure of the group changing
the motivations in this type of conversation platform, which might
crowd out the intrinsic motivations to comply with social norms.310
In order to preserve the incentive to private ordering, the law
should exempt content providers from liability for the damage
caused to internal victims. Especially since the victim holds the option to file a civil suit against the direct speaker.311
The social context may increase the damage to the reputation
of an external victim. Due to social dynamics and the failure of private ordering, the law should not allow an overall exemption to
content providers. Instead, the optimal liability regime in this online setting is notice-and-takedown. This rule allows content providers to benefit from relative certainty. By removing defamatory
308
When a group is homogenous, it may hold a prejudice regarding the credibility of a
corrective statement, which may in fact backfire, by increasing people’s commitment to
original defamatory statement. See Edward Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Does More Speech
Correct Falsehoods?, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 68 (2014).
309
The participants unite against the victim, resulting in an imbalanced dissemination
of information. For example, this private ordering limitation is reflected in hate group
pages on Facebook. These groups spread falsehoods, inspire hate, and send powerful
message to readers. In these cases, the external victim does not stand a chance to counter
speech equally. See Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate
Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1447–
48, 1450 (2011).
310
In many cases, complying with social norms is derived from the community’s desire
to preserve its independence. See Barzilai-Nahon, supra note 254, at 6. For expansion on
crowding out, see supra note 245.
311
If the victim proves his claims in court, the content provider will remove the
defamatory speech according to the decision. Currently content providers are not bound
by court decisions against direct speakers. See Blockowicz v. Williams, 630 F.3d 563, 569
(7th Cir. 2010). I believe that in this conversation realm, the result should be different.
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content from their platforms after receiving a complaint, they
would be exempt from liability.
A notice-and-takedown regime is superior to negligence-based
regime. Applying negligence-based regime in this context is possible, but at a cost. Under negligence, content providers might be
held liable even if they did not receive notice regarding a defamatory statement; instead, they might be held liable if they have failed
to anticipate and prevent the damage. A negligence-based regime
results in a legal ambiguity regarding the required liability standard.
It might be difficult for content providers to anticipate a court’s
interpretation of the tort―through negligence, casual connection,
and policy considerations―and as a result, they would be unable to
predict the scope of their liability. This legal ambiguity would lead
to a defensive strategy that may limit free speech disproportionally.
Therefore, a notice-and-takedown regime is superior and sets better balances between free speech and dignity. The conclusions outlined by the model regarding both categories of victims are in-line
with the reviewed normative consideration.312
Table II below summarizes the model and the liability regimes
for regulating content providers.
312

Exempting the liability of content providers from the damage caused to internal
victims and applying a notice-and-takedown regime for external victims sets the optimal
balance between constitutional rights and speech torts. Social norms and the ability of the
internal user to counter speech mitigates the damage; therefore, in this setting, exempting
content providers from liability is desirable and prevents a disproportional chilling effect.
The external victim’s damage is exacerbated by social dynamics. Therefore, a different
balance should be found for this setting. A notice-and-takedown regime is a proper
balance. Corrective justice justifications also support this conclusion, since the content
provider did not cause the damage to the victim; the operation of the platform is only a
background risk. It might appear as if a notice-and-takedown regime does not fit well with
corrective justice justifications. Yet, this liability regime outlines a conditioned
exemption. Therefore, this regime is not contradictory to corrective justice justifications.
These rules are also efficient economically. The costs of prevention of the proposed rule
to internal victims are relatively low in relation to the damage. However, the severity of
damage to the external user may be extensive. Therefore, from the perspective of costbenefit analysis, deterrence might be more efficient. Exempting content providers would
reduce liability risks and incentivize innovation. It might appear as if a notice-andtakedown regime would stifle innovation and might even deter entrepreneurs from
developing platforms, but this is doubtful. Proportional liability would not impede the
development of these platforms as long as profits can be generated from such settings.
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Table II: Summary of the Model
The
Conversation
Platform

The
Strength
of Ties
Weak
ties, at
most

Freestyle
Conversation

Peer
Production

Mostly
weak
ties;
Intermediary
ties
among
core
participants
form
“small
worlds”

Severity of Harm

Private Ordering

Internal
Victim

External
Victim

Internal
Victim

External
Victim

(-)
Marginal harms,
Stand-alone expressions
Heterogeneous
one-time
Participants,
Low credibility,
Immediate&
spontaneous,
Mostly anonymous,
Only few readers
(+)
Intermediary
gravity of harm;
detailed in-depth
information; heterogeneous participants; mostly
one time players;
credible information; on the other
hand, conversation is not focused on personal
information and
most participants
do not use their
real identity thus
harm is limited.

(-)
Marginal harms,
Stand-alone expressions
Heterogeneous
one-time participants, low credibility, immediate & spontaneous, mostly
anonymous, only few readers.

(+)
Market
forces
Variety
of opinions,
countering
speech
with
more
speech

(+)
Market
forces
Variety of
opinions,
countering
speech with
more
speech

(+)
Extensive gravity of harm; the
platform aggregates information to a complex product;
heterogonous
participants;
mostly one time
players; credible
information; the
defaming statements are directed towards
the victim’s real
identity.

(+)
Heterogeneous
balanced
conversation
Formal
or informal dispute resolution
mechanisms
Reciprocal
social
control

(+)
Heterogeneity
and
Diversity
brings to a
balanced
outcome
Correction
by other
participants
Feedback
and Reputation mechanisms

Content Providers’ Liability
ExterInternal
nal
Victim
Victim
(-)
(-)
Exemp- Exemption
tion
from
liability from
liability

(-)
Exemption
From
liability

(-)
Exemption
From
liability
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Severity of Harm

Private Ordering

Internal
Victim

External
Victim

Internal
Victim

External
Victim

(+)
Extensive gravity
of harm.
In-depth information,
Homogeneity
Repeat players,
Credibility.
Emotional harm.
However, the
harm for participants who choose
not to reflect
their real identity
would be limited.

(+)
Extensive gravity of harm.
In-depth
Information,
Homogeneity
Repeat players,
Credibility.
Mass attacks
against specific
victims,
Informational
and reputational
cascades.

(+)
Private
ordering
by social
norms
within
the
community
Awareness of
victims
to social
norms
and selfrisk management

(-)
Strong ties
result in
social pressure and
informational and
reputational cascades
that exacerbate
harm
Failure of
private ordering
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Victim
Victim
(-)
(+)
Exemp- Notice
tion
and
From
liability Takedown
regime

E. The Proposed Model and Law: Bridging the Gaps
The proposed model outlines context-specific liability regimes
for content providers. These liability regimes take into account the
severity of harm, the potential for countering social forces, private
ordering, and the victim’s setting (internal or external) in every
conversation platform. It offers an optimal balance between free
speech and reputation. This model refrains from utilizing a negligence liability regime and promotes a free market of ideas. Yet, the
model attempts to mitigate a victim’s harm whenever severity is
extensive and private ordering is lacking.
The current law provides an extensive shield for content providers’ immunity to civil liability for speech torts. Therefore,
courts neither account for context-specific considerations nor distinguish between conversation platforms. This overall immunity
scheme was constructed when the web was in its infancy. As the

934

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:855

web matures, this regime must be reconsidered and refined. An
overall analysis points at deliberation and community platforms as
a crucial juncture where change in the current legal infrastructure
is needed.313 Such a change will likely call for amending the relevant law, such as § 230 of the CDA. This would be done by adding
an exception to the immunity by outlining a notice-and-takedown
regime for external victims harmed by speech in conversation platforms aimed for deliberations and communities. In these online settings, courts would have the discretion to deny motions to dismiss,
allowing lawsuits to proceed from the preliminary stages if the content provider did not remove the defamatory speech after receiving
proper notice.
Enabling court discretion in regards to external victims would
allow a legal flexibility to an ever-changing setting. This proposal
offers content providers the benefit of relative certainty without
undermining the value of immunity. It would also enable courts to
adjust to changing social contexts, resulting in fair and just outcomes. This model will not cause a legal revolution because today
secondary liability lawsuits against content providers advance
beyond the preliminary stages.314 For example, there are plaintiffs
that bypass § 230 of the CDA by raising direct and contributory
claims that exceed a trivial secondary liability framework.315 In
313

This change is needed given the high risk of potential damage and the low chance for
countering social forces and private ordering.
314
Today, more than a third of the claims already survive a § 230 defense. See Ardia
supra note 62, at 493.
315
For instance, plaintiffs here might bring contractual claims, failure-to-warn claims,
and even fraud claims. See Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 767 F.3d 894, 895 (9th
Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, opinion withdrawn, 778 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2015) (basing their
claim on negligence theory); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) (basing
her claim on a contractual claim); Moore v. Angie’s List, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 3d 802, 807
(E.D. Pa. 2015) (basing their claim on fraud). In addition, I would like to note that some
lawsuits regarding content providers’ liability for speech-related torts are not barred on
preliminary stages in light of courts’ interpretation of the terms “creation” and
“development of information” in § 230 of the CDA. Thus, content providers are already
exposed to liability risks when plaintiffs file claims based on direct or contributory liability
theories. These claims exceed this discussion, since I focus on secondary liability.
Immunity is, therefore, very broad, but not hermetic. See Fair Housing Council v.
Roommates.com, LLC., 489 F.3d 921, 932 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 521 F.3d 1157
(9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the content provider developed content by designing
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some of these cases, the value of immunity is undermined. In stark
contrast, the model I propose here outlines specific guidelines that
do not cause liability ambiguity, yet they are not revolutionary.
From a normative perspective, the proposed framework brings to
an optimal balance between constitutional rights, leads to more just
results, and promotes efficiency and innovation.
F. Addressing Criticism and Objections to the Proposed Model
The model exempts content providers from secondary liability
to speech-related torts in freestyle and peer-production conversation platforms. It also exempts content providers from the liability
for the damages caused to the internal victim in deliberation and
community platforms. External victims, however, will be protected
by a notice-and-takedown regime. After drawing out this contextspecific framework for content providers’ liability, the following
Sections will acknowledge several objections to the model and will
address challenges arising from the proposed model and respond
them.
First, a possible outcome of the notice-and-takedown liability
regime is that entrepreneurs would focus their investments in
freestyle and peer-production ventures. In order to minimize liability risks, they might refrain from investing in deliberation and
community platforms, which is an undesirable outcome.
This possibility, however, is not realistic because of the business model of such websites. Most content providers are guided by
economic considerations and profits garnered by advertisements on
their sites.316 These conversation platforms are magnets of online
discriminatory drop-down menus); see generally Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings,
LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 818 (E.D. Ky. 2013), rev’d and vacated, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014)
(demonstrating that even though the content provider was ultimately exempt from
liability, the litigation was extensive and passed through number of courts).
316
Content providers compete for viewers’ eyeballs and aim to profit from commercial
advertisements on their platform. Today, technology enables advertisers to know how
many eyeballs viewed the advertisements. It can also customize content. Content
providers can display advertisements related to the content on their websites. They can
also target advertisements to particular Internet users. These advertisements may be
generated based on the user’s history, his preferences, his location, and the composition
of his social network. Content providers gain more profit from advertisements as users
pay attention to them and engage with click-through advertising. The success of online
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participation. Participants of these platforms are homogenous and
tend to be repeat players that are interested in certain subjects.
These characteristics allow targeting advertisements efficiently.
Advertisers can utilize these characteristics including the power of social influence and context in advancing their aims. Therefore, they would pay higher prices for advertising in these platforms. In order to attract more users and garner more profits, costbenefit analysis would bring content providers to invest resources
in dealing with complaints and removing defamatory content, or
else they would expose themselves to liability. They will not refrain
from investing in these platforms.317 This analysis does not apply to
non-commercial content providers, but non-profit sites are normally driven by ideology and would not forgo their investment just because of this exposure, since the liability is limited. Thus, noncommercial content providers should not lose their incentive to
invest in their platform, nor should the regime cause a chilling effect to their innovation.
The second objection might be raised in a jurisdiction governed
by different laws.318 One might argue that exempting content providers from liability in freestyle and peer-production conversation
platforms is undesirable. This regime might disincentivize voluntary regulation by content providers. It would allow users to disseminate defamatory speech irresponsibly without interference.319
I believe that such concerns are excessive. In many cases, the
motive for voluntary regulation by content providers is economic
advertising depends on the degree of customer acceptance and corresponding clickthrough rate. See JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING
INDUSTRY IS DEFINING YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH 102 (2012); Yung-Ming Li et
al., Enhancing Targeted Advertising with Social Context Endorsement, 19 INT’L J.
ELECTRONIC COMM. 99, 99–128 (2014); see generally NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH:
REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON TO GOOGLE 57–154 (2009).
317
A comparative overview proves that Facebook flourishes even in legal systems that
do not provide immunity to content providers, such as in Germany and Israel. See Zarsky,
supra note 236.
318
In Europe and Canada, other regimes regulate content providers’ liability. These
regimes apply to all conversation platforms and are not tailored to a specific context. See
supra Section I.C.
319
See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 2, at 193–99 (criticizing the
immunity regime in general); Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 119.
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and not driven by legal considerations. In other words, they voluntarily regulate defamatory content as part of their business model.
They are motivated by concern about the potential business, moral,
and instrumental costs of digital offensive speech, and they see this
speech as a potential threat to profit. Other content providers are
motivated to address offensive speech based on their sense of corporate social responsibility.320
Indeed, in certain cases the incentives for voluntary ordering
would be lost in light of the exemption from liability outlined by the
model. However, despite possible negative effects of exemption in
freestyle and peer-production conversation platforms, this regime
still offers the optimal balance from all other policy possibilities.
Due to the low severity of harm in these conversation platforms,
the outcome of voluntary regulation is the best alternative.
The third objection is directed specifically against the exemption from liability in peer-production conversation platforms. The
severity of harm in this conversation platform is extensive.321 However, countering social forces mitigate the harm and cause an efficient private-ordering scheme. One might argue that the severity of
harm remains extensive despite private ordering. This argument
rests on the “negativity bias” and the greater power of bad events,
information, or feedbacks over good ones.322 Balancing social forces
might not hold defamation at bay because negative expressions
have more gravitas than positive ones. Thus, even if negative
speech can be countered by positive speech, the correction would
not be effective. As a result, negative hearsay would outweigh the
counter-positive expressions, and the defamatory remarks would
continue to spreads rapidly and harm a person’s reputation.
This argument is valid; but, as I shall explain below, it does not
undermine the argument for exemption, since it is the best alterna320

See Citron & Norton, supra note 309, at 1453–57 (2011) (describing content
providers that see aggressive approaches to offensive speech as essential to securing
online advertising); see also LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, INFORMATION AND EXCLUSION
128 (2011).
321
The platform aggregates the participants donations into a complex and credible
product directed at specific victims. See supra Section III.D.2.
322
On this psychological bias, see Roy Baumeister et al., Bad is Stronger Than Good, 5
REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 323, 323–70 (2001).
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tive compared to the other liability regimes. Countering negative
speech may indeed mitigate speech-related harm only partially.323
As a result, readers might still have the wrong impression of victims and avoid engagement with them, which would undermine
efficient transactions. Exclusive reliance on private ordering would
allocate part of the harm to the victim; this outcome is not optimal.
Yet, alternative regimes would be even more inefficient and unjust.
Potential liability concerns would lead content providers to remove
every negative speech from their platform in response to every
complaint, when applying the notice-and-takedown regime. Alternatively, under the negligence regime, content providers might extensively remove negative speech at their own initiative, including
true negative statements. This would lead to reliance on partial information while making decisions. Thus, users might make inefficient transactions leading to negative experiences that could be
avoided given full disclosure of the facts. These inefficient engagements would bring individuals to bear all the harm stemming
from inefficient transactions.324 Everything being equal, allocating
partial harm to the victim is a better option than removing true
negative statements from platforms.
Feedback and reputation mechanisms are embedded in peerproduction platforms. These mechanisms might further mitigate
speech-related harm.325 Thus, despite the negativity bias, only limited credibility would be ascribed to the defamatory speech when
the two corrective methods are utilized. I, therefore, conclude that
exempting content providers from liability in peer-production con323

Full correction would materialize only when the correcting speech has more gravitas
both quantitatively and qualitatively. A lot of positive correcting elements might correct
negative falsehoods efficiently despite the negativity bias. See David Hoffman & Dawn
Ash, Building Bridges to Resolve Conflict and Overcome the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”: The Vital
Role of Professional Relationships in the Collaborative Law Process, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 271,
294 (2010).
324
For example, removing negative true reviews about a hotel on a review site would
mislead Internet users about their future stay. Users would not be privy to the
information from former guests who did not enjoy their stay. As a result, they would not
avoid spending their vacation in the hotel. In light of the negativity bias, bad experiences
caused by inefficient transactions that could be avoided, would be remembered for long
periods.
325
On these mechanisms, see supra note 196 and accompanying text.

2016]

CONTENT PROVIDERS’ SECONDARY LIABILITY

939

versation platforms is superior to other liability regimes, and it
promotes the best solution to just and efficient outcomes considering the alternatives.
The fourth objection might be directed at the exemption of
content providers for the damages caused to internal victim. The
internal victim can control his network personality, use pseudonym, or totally refrain from participation and should not be entitled to remedies from the content provider. One might argue that
a liability exemption would result in aggressive conversation
norms, lack of accountability, and self-exclusion of many participants from these realms, thus infringing the freedom of speech.326
Due to the diversity of conversation platforms, the infringement is not stark. We should bear in mind that self-exclusion from
conversation platforms may occur outside the Internet. Online, the
implications of self-exclusion are actually mitigated due to the
availability of other platforms, making this option tolerable.327 The
victim can quit participating and find another platform that fits his
needs. In addition, he can establish a conversation platform himself
and enforce his preferred deliberation culture.328
Indeed, some communities have no substitute, such as learning
communities or online workplace communities. As a result, opting
out from these platforms might prevent users from receiving im326

Exempting content providers from liability might cause frequent self-exclusion of
actual and potential participants. Witnessing aggressive conversation norms, individuals
would opt out or refrain from opting in a discussion platform. If content providers would
not provide them with a relief, few users would remain on the platform. See CITRON,
HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 2, at 195; Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note
2, at 132 (referring to defamation and harassment online directed at disadvantaged groups
in society and leading to self-exclusion, which undermines the victim’s right to free
speech).
327
The wealth of conversation platforms mitigates the problem of self-exclusion.
Online, everyone can find the optimal conversation platform for himself. Internal
defamation victims can exit the offensive conversation platform and move to another.
The lock-in effect and the difficulty to exchange conversation platform is mitigated
online. On the lock in effect, see Ruben Rodrigues, Privacy on Social Networks: Norms,
Markets, and Natural Monopoly, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND
REPUTATION, supra note 2, at 237, 246.
328
Any speaker can establish a personal blog on a commercial website or an
independent platform optimal for his needs.
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portant professional updates. These special communities might
justify specific exceptions to the model and a more flexible analysis.
However, these special communities are mere exceptions to the
general rule outlined.
The model assumes that individuals can anticipate the risks of
participation in advance. It also assumes they can opt out from
conversations and exit the social community. However, one may
argue that participants’ autonomy is not absolute due to peer pressure.329 In response to this argument, I claim that the right to autonomy is varied by degrees and depends on context.330 Thus, the
right to autonomy is not absolute.
Perhaps special considerations should be made for minors.
Adults certainly find it difficult to evaluate future risks when participating in a specific conversation platform; yet they can opt out
of a conversation and minimize their harm. Adults are assumed to
have the autonomy to a degree that would allow them to make the
right decisions for themselves. Exiting online communities is easier
than quitting conversations offline because on the Internet participants have many alternative conversation platforms.
Minors, unlike adults, are less rational and tend to be more influenced by social pressures. Hence, the social dynamics might affect them differently, and they might stay in a destructive community despite being defamed. Therefore, in this context, it might be
advisable to impose additional duties on content providers by specific regulation pertaining to age.331 However, this suggestion is
complementary to the model and does not undermine it.
329

Individuals are subjected to cognitive biases. Thus, at the time of the decision to
participate, they might be over-optimistic and not evaluate social pressures and other
anticipated risks. See SUNSTEIN, RUMORS, supra note 235, at 21–30. Extensive research
addressed the limits of autonomy. Accordingly, individuals materialize their autonomy
only if society enables them. Therefore, individuals should be protected from external
influences in order to enable them to materialize their autonomy. See ISAIAH BERLIN,
TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY: AN INAUGURAL LECTURE DELIVERED BEFORE THE
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD ON 31 OCTOBER 1958 (1959).
330
See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE AND THE
PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 16–21 (2012).
331
The law already protects minors online by specific regulation in the context of
privacy. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506
(2006). Additional regulation might be needed in order to protect minors from
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The fifth objection to the model concerns search engines. One
might argue that in light of the option to find information using
search engines, distinctions between conversation platforms is
meaningless. The search results reflect specific expressions and get
them out of the conversation platform’s context. Search engines
blur the line between internal and external settings. Thus, exposure
to a statement regarding the internal victim via search engines does
not enable the users to witness private-ordering dynamics.
Indeed search engines show specific statements independently,
detached from their original conversation platform and group context. However, this does not change the suggested taxonomy.
Search engines get expressions out of context only on the first layer
of search results (this layer includes short quotations in the results
page). However, when an individual has an interest in a specific
search result, he would not be satisfied with the partial quotation
and would follow the link, which would expose him to the privateordering dynamics of the group. Hence, search engines do not undermine the distinctions between conversation platforms and
group contexts as far as content providers’ liability is concerned.332
CONCLUSION AND THE PATH FORWARD
Technologies enable vast opportunities to carry out speechrelated torts. Content providers are highly visible “choke points”
for online speech. Therefore, the legal discussion turns to their liability and the ability to collect damages from these deep-pocketed,
defamatory statements. Terms of Service in popular social networks do not allow minors
under thirteen years old to participate. Therefore, a partial solution to the problem is
enforcing the Terms of Service and imposing content providers to verify participants’
ages. Cf. How Old Do You Have To Be To Sign Up for Facebook?, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/210644045634222
[https://perma.cc/J9D8-LDPV]
(last visited Mar. 2, 2016) (requiring users to be at least thirteen years old).
332
This conclusion does not stand in line with the ruling in the European Union
regarding the “right to be forgotten.” See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia
Española de Protección de Datos, A.N., 2014 E.C.R. 317, at para. 91. However, I believe
this ruling is too extensive. In the United States, there is no general “right to be
forgotten.” See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745-746 (9th Cir. 2015); Google, Inc.
v. Expunction Order, 441 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Tex. App. 2014).
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ever-present entities that facilitate the harmful exchange. This Article aspired to take initial steps to address content providers’ liability for speech torts. I laid theoretical and practical outlines to a
new innovative model for regulating content providers’ liability.
This model is based on a sociological approach and emphasizes the
importance of the conversation platforms’ contexts, rather than the
content of the expressions themselves. Coming from this approach,
I focused on the strength of ties between participants, their social
dynamics, and interactions, rather than on the content of the
speech.
Basing this study on network theory studies, I classified online
conversation to three main categories, creating an innovative taxonomy knotted to social structures. I translated this taxonomy to
legal terms. This framework distinguishes between conversation
platforms and group contexts. It shows that in some contexts, private ordering mitigates harm efficiently, whereas in others, it is insufficient. As a result, some formal legal intervention is needed.
This model aims to structure judicial discretion and assist courts to
accommodate just and efficient policy in determining content providers’ liability for speech torts. The model is not abstract and refrains from relying on open-ended standards, such as severity of
harm, private ordering, and the victim’s setting. Rather, it outlines
modular rules that serve as a proxy to these standards.
This model might appear less accurate in comparison to an
open-ended based model that enables broad judicial discretion or
reference to a specific circumstance, such as the characteristics of a
specific platform. The model’s benefits are certainty and clarity. It
allows courts to apply simple rules of thumb, avoiding cumbersome
litigation since it determines the scope of liability based on social
dynamics and contexts. These rules of thumb would contribute and
improve judicial processes and direct courts to systematic and consistent decisions. This would also enable content providers, who
are often repeat-players in court, efficient risk management. I believe that this model is superior to the legal regime that exists to-
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day, since it offers just and efficient outcomes, and it promotes the
social values discussed throughout this Article.333
This Article is not the last word on this topic. It leaves several
questions unanswered: Can this taxonomy be applied to unmasking
anonymous speakers? What is the speakers’ direct liability? Should
this model regulate the direct liability of speakers? Another challenge concerns the spread of falsehoods, sharing and diffusing defamatory speech among different conversation platforms, and the
implications on content providers’ liability. What liability regime
should apply to content providers that get defamatory speech out
of the original social context, and share and republish it on other
platforms governed by different liability regimes? And how should
the law regulate users’ social sharing of falsehoods between different conversation platforms?334 These challenges and others should
be discussed in future studies.

333

A modular model for determining content providers’ liability reduces concerns of
inconsistency and different rulings in similar cases. The outcome of applying these rules
of thumb would enhance fairness, efficiency, and promote innovation. As I explained,
applying this model would bring the proper balance between human rights and speech
torts. It would also prevent disproportional reputation harms in an environment that
espouses free speech.
334
New innovative technologies facilitate the distribution of content among different
platform in a click of a button, for example, by using social-based comment systems and
Application Programming Interface technology. Sharing content between platforms is
common nowadays. The model in this Article outlines different liability regimes for
different conversation realms. However, sharing content among different conversation
realms get them out of their original social context.

